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20 July 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

MASSACRE ANNIVERSARY ECHOED BY 52 U.S. CONGRESSMEN, MEDIA

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 7 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Karl E. Meyer: "The April Massacre and the American Press"]

[Excerpt] On 21-24 April 1983, 52 U.S. Senators and Congressmen strongly brought up the issue of the Genocide perpetrated in 1915 by the Turks against the Armenians. Those addressing this issue included Senators Percy, Tsongas, Kennedy, as well as other prominent members of Congress.

The efforts of Congressman Charles Pashayan as well as those of the Armenian National Committee (ANC of America) and other Armenian political organizations bore fruit, and in spite of obstructive efforts by the Turkish ambassador to Washington, Elekdag, the 21 April session of Congress was transformed into an arena of evocation of the 1915 Genocide and of condemnation of the Turkish Government and the people who perpetrated this monstrous crime. Nineteen pages of fine print of the proceedings of that day's session in the Congressional Record dealt with evocation of the 1915 Genocide.

Senator Paul Tsongas addressed the Senate on 21 April, demanding that 24 April 1984 be designated "a Day of Remembrance of all victims of the Genocide, especially those Armenians who perished in the years 1915-1923."

The Senator proposed that President Reagan proclaim 24 April 1984 a Day of Remembrance.

Articles, letters and analysis pieces signed by American intellectuals and writers were also published in the U.S. press on the occasion of the 68th anniversary of the April massacre. A number of newspapers responded to "The Forgotten Genocide" with editorial articles:

The 24 April issue of the HARTFORD COURANT contained an editorial entitled "The Forgotten Genocide," analyzing the events of 1915.

An editorial entitled "Whitewashing Genocide," appearing in the 26 April issue of the BERGEN RECORD, stresses the point that the Genocide perpetrated against the Armenians in 1915 is a genuine fact of history.

The 25 April issue of the EVENING GAZETTE (Worcester) contained an editorial entitled "The Earlier Genocide," confirming the fact of the 1915 Genocide.

The 24 April issue of the INDIANAPOLIS STAR reflects the anger on the part of the American Armenian community to the two-faced statement by the U.S. State Department concerning the 1915 Genocide and the events of 1915.

On the first page of the 21 April issue of the HARTFORD COURANT is an article written by (Tom Kunts) entitled "Armenian Ire Aroused by State Department," which discusses in detail the events of 1915 and finds ridiculous the position taken by the U.S. State Department.

An editorial article by Karl Meyer in the 23 April issue of the NEW YORK TIMES, entitled "Armenian Memory, Turkish Amnesia," reflects on the slaughter of one and a half million Armenians as described by Franz Werfel in "Forty Days of Musa Dagh," concluding that "the First Genocide of the 20th Century deserves attention."

The 5 May issue of the NEW YORK TIMES publishes a letter by (A. Ritlemeyer), a research scientist at Harvard University, entitled "After the 1915 Massacres of Armenians." The scientist notes his distress at the fact that present-day Turkey does not see fit to accept its responsibility for the events which took place during the days of the Ottoman Government.

Unquestionably other newspapers throughout the United States also reported the events commemorating the 68th anniversary of the 1915 Genocide.

The 23 April issue of the NEW YORK TIMES contains an article by Karl Meyer entitled "Armenian Memory, Turkish Amnesia."

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CSO: 4605/84

DRAWBACKS OF EXISTING EXPORT REGULATIONS CITED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 May 83 p 9

[Article by Ra'fat Amin: "Is There an End to Export Problems?"]

[Text] More than 20 steps are to be taken for exporting goods. Costs for export measures represent 25 percent of the costs of exports.

Experts are asking that export measures be completed in one agency and inspection agencies combined.

Egyptian exports have caught the fever of spoilage that has plagued food exports. Estimates indicate that the total loss of agricultural loss to spoilage during the export process has amounted to 100 percent. This happens, of course, among the best kinds and varieties of fruits. The truth is that this figure is misleading because it also includes the time and effort that are lost. What is even more important, the figure also includes the loss of our reputation in foreign markets as exporters.

But why is the percentage of what is lost to spoilage in Egyptian exports so alarmingly high? The answer, of course, is red tape and bureaucracy. We do not exaggerate when we say that negligence, the failure to appreciate responsibility and the scores of complicated steps and repetitive futile measures cause goods to spoil or almost to spoil before they are exported. By the time the goods reach an importer, they would have actually been spoiled.

The question of export measures has therefore occupied a prominent place in the interests of agencies responsible for the growth of exports. The suitable way for considering all the implications of this problem was to hold a symposium to discuss simplifying export measures. The symposium which was set up by the Export Development Center was held over a period of 2 days in the customs zone in the Port of Alexandria. Problems preceding shipping operations and problems pertaining to customs measures certificates, documents and shipping were discussed.

The symposium was attended by Faruq Shaqwir, director of the Export Development Center and secretary of the symposium; by Salah 'Awad, chief of the Export Import Control Authority, who inaugurated the symposium on behalf of the minister of the economy; by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Mawjud, export development adviser to the minister of the economy and undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance for Customs Affairs in

Alexandria; by the chief of the shipping sector in the Arab Shipping and Unloading Company; by the export section in the Chamber of Commerce; and by representatives of the Central Agency for Organization and Management.

At the beginning of the symposium Dr Faruq Shaqwir said that the cost of export measures was between 15 and 25 percent of the cost of producing an article that is to be exported. "Our exports thus lose the ability to offer competitive prices in world markets."

Dr Shaqwir divided the stages of the export process into three stages. The first stage has to do with the process of production. The second stage is that which [goods go through] between the production stage and the customs outlet. It includes internal transportation operations and handling. The third stage begins at the customs gate [and continues until the goods that are to be exported] are on board the ship. Dr Shaqwir said that over the past 3 years Egyptian exports declined by 20 percent. At the same time imports rose by over 16 percent. This creates a constant burden on the balance of payments that amounts to 35 percent. A country like Egypt, which is trying to develop society, cannot tolerate that burden. Dr Shaqwir indicated that growth in the agricultural sector did not exceed three percent and that the rate of growth in the industrial sector was six percent.

Symposium chairman Salah 'Awad indicated that the state's aim was to use all means and methods to promote exports and remove all administrative and executive constraints on the execution of this objective. He said that the state also wanted to simplify measures so as to set up a climate in which exports can be shipped promptly and the quality of those exports guaranteed. The state also wants to ensure that its export plan, whose goal is to increase annual exports by no less than 10 percent, is implemented so that the deficit in the balance of payments can be dealt with.

Mr 'Awad indicated that documents, measures and signatures were duplicated, particularly the measures that were carried out by executive agencies, either in banks, customs, in shipping and unloading agencies, or in inspection agencies. This requires that the measures be examined and simplified in a practical and decisive manner.

Salah 'Awad commented on the cost of export measures and on the fees that are collected from exporters by every state agency. He said that these fees were between five and seven percent. Regarding the percentage of spoiled goods he indicated that in Egyptian agricultural exports the percentage of spoiled goods may not be more than 60 percent. He said that 40 percent of the spoiled goods were attributable to trade defects and not to the fact that export inspection agencies slowed down measures. The facts, however, are otherwise. There are no agricultural crops designated for export, particularly among traditional goods which are exported by cooperatives. Despite the supervision of the Cooperative Marketing Agency no more than 50 percent of these goods meet [the required] specifications.

To ensure good quality the agency inspects some goods three times. Potatoes, in particular, are inspected at production sites, at packing stations and at the shipping port. Without such strict control we would lose many markets for important traditional goods.

At this point some exporters indicated that each one of them was concerned about protecting his reputation in foreign markets. Therefore, they protect quality standards.

Salah 'Awad commented that it was hardly possible to avoid spoilage as a result of poor packing or shipping operations.

Salah 'Awad reviewed the export steps and measures and the export documents [that must be provided for] exported goods. These steps exceed 20 steps. At each step, of course, numerous endorsements must be obtained. In some steps more than one executive agency would do the same work that other agencies, particularly inspection agencies, would do. The symposium made it evident that exporters obtain close to 64 signatures so they can export the goods they want to export. Of course, there is an equal number of stamp papers they have to obtain as well.

Exporters raised [questions] during the discussion about some problems they face during the export process. Khamis al-Shafi'i, an exporter of agricultural products, indicated that packing materials presented an obstacle to them. He said that importers require certain specifications for packaging the goods they export, and they are forced to import these packaging materials because similar packaging materials are not produced in Egypt. They pay the cost of these packaging materials and the customs fees for them when they arrive so they can export their goods. This causes delays in the export process. They also lose time in the Ministry of the Economy and in the Ministry of Finance trying to get import permits and then recover the sums of money that were paid when they imported the materials after the export process is completed.

Ihab al-Misiri, the owner of a textile plant and an exporter, indicated that after the resolutions of the Minister of the Economy are issued--resolutions pertaining to setting proceeds from exports aside--it will be possible to simplify the measures of Form (TS). It will be possible to have customs re-price goods, to simplify those re-pricing measures and to make the purpose of these measures statistical and not restrictive and regulatory.

'Abd-al-Majid Rustum, vice president of the General Division of Exporters called for combining the inspection agencies into one agency, instead of having three agencies inspect the goods.

'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasib, an exporter, added that a new inspection agency had been added. He said it was the Public Agency for Inspecting Exports.

Salah 'Awad commented that it was the role of the agency to monitor all exported goods. [He said] the agency has been playing that role after [its] special testing laboratories were completed according to the most modern systems. Therefore, the role of monitoring manufactured goods and quarantining agricultural products should be restricted to locally consumed goods only.

Exporters asked that shipping prices for exporters who ship on Egyptian vessels be reduced. They asked that world shipping prices be posted so that shipping costs can be calculated in advance along with total production costs. The Export Development Center agreed to prepare lists of the kinds of goods that are exported and the freight charges that would be due on these goods, and they

agreed to make this information known to exporters. Exporters asked that one export permit be utilized to export goods that are sent abroad in several shipments, instead of going through the same steps at the time each shipment is exported. A committee was formed from the Export Development Center and the Public Authority for Inspection and Customs to consider the possibility of breaking up shipments.

The symposium came out with numerous recommendations. Most importantly it recommended the necessity of having the representatives of all agencies who have something to do with export measures present in the same place so that export operations can be completed at once. A recommendation was made that an authorized technical committee be given the authority to approve the importation of packaging materials for agricultural products. This committee would replace the craftsmen committee to expedite the process of making the decision to import. The recommendation asked that these articles be exempt from customs fees as long as they are sent to the exporting company. The purpose of that is to reduce costs and simplify measures. It is necessary that one agency be designated as the agency to issue executive decisions pertaining to export operations. The recommendations called for the elimination of all installment payments made in all stages as long as exporters pay their taxes; those installments may be collected in another manner. The recommendations asked that exporting trade samples, limited to 150 pounds, be permitted directly through customs. Anything in excess of 150 pounds would be presented to the Public Inspection Agency but would not have to go through the other remaining export documentation [procedures] and measures.

Dr Faruq Shaqwir indicated that the recommendations of the symposium will be presented to the Supreme Committee for Export Development so that the committee may make its decisions in that regard.

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REPORT ON NATURAL GAS AS ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF ENERGY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 May 83 p 9

[Article by 'Adil Ibrahim: "Will Natural Gas Continue To Be a Mere Substitute for Traditional Uses of Mazut, Solar and Butagaz?"]

[Text] After numerous natural gas fields were discovered in the group of oil fields that were recently discovered over the past 3 years, natural gas reserves grew at a rate that would permit increased dependence on natural gas to meet local needs and to change the structure of oil products consumption in the industrial, power and housing sectors and in homes.

Egypt began using natural gas 8 years ago, in 1975. We now have seven natural gas fields: three of them are producing at the present time. These are the Abu Madi Field in the north Delta, Abu Al-Gharadiq Field in the western desert and the offshore field of Abu Qir. The other four fields are being prepared for production.

Natural gas consumption rates rose from 46 million cubic meters a year in 1975 from the Abu Madi Field to 2.417 billion cubic meters a year last year. This increase followed the bringing in of gas from the two fields of Abu al-Gharadiq. Gas from these two fields was connected to the cement and the iron and steel plants in Hulwan and Turah. Gas from the offshore field of Abu Qir was brought in in 1979 to supply natural gas to the fertilizer plants in Abu Qir and to power stations.

A few days ago the Public Egyptian Petroleum Authority organized a symposium about the priorities of utilizing and industrializing natural gas. The symposium was inaugurated by Engineer 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, president of the Petroleum Authority on behalf of Engineer Ahmad 'Izz al-Din Hilal, deputy prime minister for production and minister of oil. [The discussion at the symposium] included an examination of the use of natural gas in the various sectors of consumption. Chief among those is the use of gas in existing and new projects as a substitute for the traditional uses of mazut, solar and butagaz. Natural gas may also be used in the areas of domestic and commercial consumption; in power generation by gas turbines in maximum load stations, in producing glass, pottery and china; and in producing nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers. Natural gas may also be injected in crude oil wells. After that natural gas may be used in the production of cement and sponge iron.

Chemist 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, president of the Petroleum Authority said that natural gas is being used in three areas at the present time.

--It is used as a conversion material in the fertilizer and iron and steel industries. Natural gas will be used in the sponge iron project in al-Dakhilah.

--Natural gas is being burned instead of mazut and solar in the furnaces of cement plants, power stations and textile plants.

--Natural gas is being used in homes as a substitute for liquid petroleum gas, [i.e.] butagaz.

Mr Qandil explains that the Petroleum Authority does bear in mind the ideal utilization of natural gas components in fields that have been discovered and are being put to profitable use. Geologist Ra'uf Muhammad Fa'iq, vice president of the Petroleum Authority affirms that there are two kinds of natural gas: it is either accompanying gas or natural gas. Accompanying gases are found dissolved in crude oil under the surface of the earth as a result of pressure and temperature conditions in the underground reservoir. When the crude oil is brought out to the surface, air pressure [acts upon it], and most of these gases are separated from the crude oil. Every barrel of oil is accompanied by a quantity of accompanying natural gases that are estimated on the average to be about 500 cubic feet. The composition of the accompanying natural gases varies according to the conditions of each oil field.

Natural gases, however, are obtained from fields that do not contain crude oil. Stated briefly these natural gases can be utilized by separating methane gases from ethane gases and using them locally as fuel in iron, aluminum and cement production operations, in power generation, in water desalination [operations] and also in the production of fertilizers and petrochemicals. The remaining components of the gases, which are propane, butane and petroleum condensers, are extracted and shipped to butagaz bottling stations as is the case in Abu al-Gharadiq Field. The ideal use for these gases is to use them in the production of petrochemicals, plastics, synthetic fibres and detergents.

Whereas the Petroleum Authority is presently undertaking the implementation of a plan for utilizing the natural gases and accompanying gases that were recently discovered in commercial quantities that encourage the economic utilization of these gases, Engineer Ahmad 'Izz al-Din Hilal, deputy prime minister for production and minister of oil issued his instructions that a flexible policy be devised to intensify exploratory operations and the search for natural gases. At the same time several new projects are now being implemented for the utilization of natural gases. [The following] are among these projects:

[There is one project] to increase the production and use of natural gas so that natural gas use would constitute 30 percent of energy consumption over the next 20 years. Natural gas production from present fields is to be increased from 9 million cubic meters a day to 16 million cubic meters a day by the end of next year. Besides, there are projects for completing the pipeline that would transport the accompanying gases from the offshore and land fields of the Gulf of Suez. This pipeline will be 283 meters long, and it will have a capacity for transporting 3.2 million cubic meters a day. It will serve the fertilizer and

cement projects and the power generating stations in Suez. At the present time the second stage in the development of the offshore gas fields of Abu Qir is being carried out by means of a 90 million dollar loan from the IBRD. This will double production from that field from the present 3.2 million cubic meters a day to 6.4 million cubic meters a day. In addition, the gas [production] station in the Abu Madi Field is being expanded, restored and repaired to double gas production from 3.4 million cubic meters a day to 6.8 million [cubic] meters; 900 cubic meters of condensers a day [will also be produced]. It is expected that 160 tons of liquid gas, [that is], butagaz, will be extracted in 1985.

According to Engineer 'Abd-al-Hamid Abu Bakr, president of the Petroleum Gases Company, while implementation of the project to connect natural gas to homes in Misr al-Jadidah, in Nasr City, in Hulwan and in Ma'adi is underway, preparations are also being made at the present time to implement a project in the area west of the Nile to serve 120,000 consumers in al-Haram, al-Jizah, al-Duqqi, al-'Ajazah, al-Muhandisin and Imbabah. This project will cost 70 million pounds, but it will save the state 95 million pounds a year. Preparations have begun for implementing the project to connect natural gas to Alexandria. This project will cost 100 million dollars, but it will save the state 360 million dollars a year and serve 160,000 consumers.

On the other hand a loan from the IBRD is being used to prepare two commercial natural gas discoveries for production in the area of Abu Sinan and 'Alam al-Shawish in the western desert. These discoveries over an area of 3,500 square kilometers were confirmed.

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NEW DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR GREATER CAIRO

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21 May 83 p 3

[Interview with Sa'd Ma'mun, minister of local government by Muhammad Basha: "Cairo's Urban Image in the Year 2000; 'AL-AHRAM Investigations' Presents a Complete Report on Residential Plans for Cairo Examined by President Mubarak" date and place not specified]

[Text] Minister of local government announces, "Planning will turn the governorates of Cairo, al-Jizah and al-Qalyubiyah into a region that is 100 percent urban."
The 1,440 feddans of farm land that are lost every year are to be preserved.
Noise, water and air pollution to be curtailed.

Over a period of 75 minutes last Tuesday President Husni Mubarak listened to a comprehensive study of construction planning for Greater Cairo until the year 2000.

The new plan was explained by Sa'd Ma'mun, minister of local government who presented to the president maps of Greater Cairo drafted by experts. According to those plans the governorates of Cairo, al-Jizah and al-Qalyubiyah would be turned into a region that will be 100 percent urban.

According to the plan seen by the president, Greater Cairo will include about 16.5 million citizens. In addition to providing urban expansion, the purpose of the plan is to preserve farmland. Figures make it evident that four feddans of the best farm land are lost to construction every day. At the end of every year these feddans that are lost to construction add up to the large figure of 1,440 feddans. This is despite the fact that Greater Cairo is surrounded by desert.

An important question emerges at the outset. The question is this: why are we thinking about residential planning?

[Answer] Very briefly, we are thinking about this to confront the growing population increase in the governorates of the country, to improve the conditions of facilities so they can accommodate the present population as well as the expected increase; and to develop the region so it would become 100 percent urban. There is, in particular, a set of facts confirmed by studies that make such planning urgently necessary so we can face the conditions of the future over the next 17 years. These facts are:

--Population Growth: It is expected that the population of the region, which includes Cairo, al-Jizah and al-Qalyubiyah, will increase by 7.4 million persons over the next 17 years. This means that in the year 2000 the population of that region will be about 16.5 million persons instead of the present 9.5 million. Population density will exceed 300 persons per feddan. It will be higher in some sections such as Bab al-Shi'riyah, where it will be 850 persons per feddan. In 1960 population density in a suburb like al-Zamalik, for example, did not exceed 56 persons per feddan. Today it is 332 persons per feddan.

--Residential Changes: Studies indicate that residential growth in the region has been taking place at the expense of good farm land; 50 percent of the land [designated for residential development is farm land]. Every year 2,880 feddans are converted to residential use. Of this land 1,440 feddans are agricultural land. This growth in the loss of agricultural land to construction amounted to 49 percent in al-Jizah, 35 percent in al-Qalyubiyah and 16 percent in Cairo.

0.17 Feddan Is Per Capita Share of Verdant Land

--Shortage of Human Services: We also find that the per capita share of residential land is 30.78 surface meters. This fact confirms a high population density [in Cairo], if compared, for example, with the per capita share of land in Paris, where it is 200 meters; in Riyadh, where it is 220 meters; and in Tunisia and Moscow, where it is 100 meters.

Also the per capita share of verdant and recreational land [in Cairo] amounts to 0.17 linear meters.

The concentration of residential or services buildings is also striking, amounting, for example to 500 surface meters for a school; in [other] countries of the world it amounts to 15,000 meters. This is besides the sources of air, noise and other kinds of pollution.

--The Weakness of Urban Areas: Although residents of the region make up 22 percent of the republic's total population and 43 percent of the country's urban population, the region has only six small cities besides the capitals of the governorates. These six cities are al-Hawamdiyah, al-Badrashin and Usim in al-Jizah Governorate; and al-Khankah, Qalyub and al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah in al-Qalyubiyah Governorate. This naturally is unacceptable. Therefore, the objective of the new plan is to urbanize the entire region fully, particularly if we realize that new basic factors, which became manifest in the three governorates, require that preliminary plans be reconsidered when final plans are made. These basic factors are economic, and chief among them are the open-door projects. There are other social basic factors, and chief among those are internal migration and the special problems it creates in housing and utilities.

For all these reasons changing this image was a matter of urgent necessity. This is what made the Council of Ministers headed by Dr Fu'ad Muhi al-Din place this matter at the forefront of its concerns. Accordingly, after the integrated plan was completed, I presented it to President Husni Mubarak who showed tremendous interest in it. He issued directives that all agencies were to do their part in the implementation [of these plans]."

[Question] Every strategic plan has specific objectives. What are the objectives that would be realized by this plan?

[Answer] This plan is striving to realize two specific objectives. They are:

1. Increased productivity and economic growth for the region. This can be brought about by preserving farm land, improving the system of industrial settlement and regulating the residential framework in the region to reduce the need for transporting individuals and materials. [It can be done by] increasing the efficiency of existing utilities, by preserving historical resources and antiquities and by other factors as well that increase the region's revenues, such as developing tourism.

2. The second objective is to improve the means of life and the environment. This can be done by reducing [population] concentrations in the region and limiting the growth of the principal residential bloc. It can be done by providing families on fixed and moderate incomes with land as an alternative to the haphazard housing which is unfortunately concentrated on agricultural land. In addition, the various suburbs are to be redesigned and the residential framework for existing regions is to be regulated by providing services to those regions, by increasing the rate at which existing housing units are connected to public utilities, by preserving water resources, curbing water pollution and by controlling limits on air and noise pollution.

Six Residential Sectors: Expansion in Five Centers

[Question] What are the implications of achieving an urban growth plan for the region, and how would it be implemented?

[Answer] There are four basic strategies for achieving urban growth for the region. The goal of all these strategies is to control the process of residential development so as to face the population increase which will amount to 7.4 million persons over the next 17 years and offer better services to future residents as well as current residents. The implementation particulars of these four strategies are manifested in the following [points]:

--First, homogeneous sectors for the current residential bloc are to be determined. This is to be done by dividing the current residential area into six sectors for the purpose of controlling growth within these sectors. These sectors would then be connected to each other by urban means, and they would be designed to accommodate 4.4 million persons of the expected increase in the region's population. This would be based on increasing the capacity of present residential areas by 1 million; increasing the capacity of present and planned residential areas by another million; planning to accommodate 1.5 million persons in desert land after the route for the region's beltline is determined; and increasing the capacity of farm land within the boundaries of this beltline by 900,000.

--The second strategy consists of establishing new independent residential communities and satellite cities to accommodate 1 million persons of the remaining 3 million. These residential communities and satellite cities would be established in part of 10 Ramadan City and in the cities of 6 October, al-Amal, al-'Ubur, Badr, 15 Mayu and al-Salam.

--The third strategy is one of development centers and routes outside the main residential bloc. New proposed communities would be established on desert land. These communities would accommodate the remaining increase in the population which would be distributed among 5 centers.

--The western center: the 6 October-al-Sadat Center, which would accommodate 750,000 persons.

--The Northeastern Center: Cairo-Bilbays, and it will accommodate 360,000 persons; 240,000 of them will be in the city of al-'Ubur.

--The Cairo-Suez Center: 250,000 persons in the city of al-'Ubur.

--The Cairo-al-Qatamiyah-al-'Ayn al-Sukhnah Center: half a million persons are designated for that center.

--The Cairo-Hulwan Center: it would include 400,000 persons.

--The fourth strategy is manifested in linking all these strategies together so that Greater Cairo would become a fully integrated urban region.

[Question] What are the guarantees that this plan will be implemented?

[Answer] I presented to the president a set of specific recommendations whose purpose is to overcome all obstacles to implementation. Among these recommendations are [the following]:

1. General political recommendations that include issuing a law prohibiting the establishment of any economic activities that would attract residents. Another law was recommended to transfer to new areas in the desert some activities that conflict with land use [policies in the region] and cause environmental problems and hazards, such as some industries, warehouses, storage houses and graveyards.

2. I recommended that the particulars of the plan be completed. The contractual agreement between the Ministry of Reconstruction and France requires that a study be made of the beltline and the six sectors in the present residential bloc. It requires that the new proposed residential areas be planned outside the beltline in desert land and that desert land necessary for this plan be prepared.

3. Decrees from the Council of Ministers

- A. Site selections for administrative establishments that would generate heavy traffic are to be curtailed. Site selections for establishments such as convention halls, hotels, theaters, fair grounds and an opera house are to be made properly.

- B. Some ministries and activities as well as any new university colleges that may be in new concentration areas are to be transferred out of the region.

- C. Construction of high-rise buildings is to be curtailed so that there would be no more than 120 residents per feddan.

4. The Supreme Council on Traffic is authorized to complete the necessary studies and make the appropriate decisions to solve the traffic problem now and subsequently.

5. Residential Planning: Detailed plans for backward areas within the residential bloc are to be devised, and the best economic use for these areas is to be determined. Programs are to be devised for reducing population density and raising environmental standards in those areas, and the stages of implementation as well as the necessary funding for these programs are to be determined.

6. The Role of the Governorates: This consists of coordinating [the efforts of] the three governorates and [obtaining] the approval of local councils in those governorates.

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MONUMENT OCCUPANTS EXPRESS OPINIONS ON EVICTION RULING

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 May 83 p 3

[Article by Lamis al-Tahawi and Samir al-Suruji: "What Will Happen after the People's Assembly Ruling That Occupants of Historic Sites Be Evicted Immediately? People Living in Historical Sites Speak Up: Those Who Have Leases and Those Who Are Trespassing"]

[Text] The debate is still lively; it is rather an impassioned debate about the question of Islamic monuments in which, according to official 1982 statistics, about 32,000 citizens are dwelling.

The debate in the People's Assembly was enthusiastic and impassioned. All government officials took part in the debate, and an announcement was made at the end that people could not be evicted from these historical sites unless the laws themselves were changed or alternative dwellings found for those who are living with their children in these historical monuments. This announcement was made by the minister of culture and his colleague, the minister of local government.

The minister of the interior announced that he was prepared to evict all trespassers who had no legal claim to be in these monuments.

Dr Suhayr warned that Egypt's most valuable treasures were being destroyed. She stated that a tenant in al-Ghuri Mosque had sawn apart four marble pillars from the dome of the historic mosque and that he had not been reprimanded by anyone!

The picture inside the historical sites where God's creatures are living is tragic, sad and pitiful. People who live in those places, with or without leases, have much to say and have much on their minds. First, [they say] they are not to blame for what is happening.

In view of the ruling that occupants of mosques be evicted immediately, those who are concerned with this matter--tenants and store owners--must be interviewed to find out their reaction to the news.

Fear and uncertainty were the two [emotions] most evident in the eyes and on the faces of all the people without exception, whether they were living in homes that had been in their families for hundreds of years or whether they were earning their living by renting small shops [attached to] the walls surrounding

historical mosques. Rent for these shops was between 40 piasters and 3 pounds. Most of this rent is divided between the Ministry of Religious Trusts and the beneficiaries of those trusts.

Wikalah Al-Firakh

Mrs Hikmat Mahmud Khattab, widow of Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Shu'aybi lives with her daughter, her son, her son's wife and their children in a house on the corner of al-Ghamri Alley on Amir al-Juyush (al-Jawani) Street, which used to be called Wikalah al-Firakh. This means that three families are living in the al-Shu'aybi house, which is one of the most beautiful houses built in the Islamic style. Mrs Hikmat says, "We inherited this house where I, my children and grandchildren are living; it's been handed down from one generation to the next. I was married 40 years ago, and this house was part of a religious trust set up by my husband's grandfather. On the first floor we have a religious school for teaching the Holy Koran; the school was donated by our ancestors."

Mrs Hikmat produced the papers to prove that their presence in the house was legitimate. She said, "We have not failed at all in preserving our heritage. [The Department of] Antiquities is always doing the necessary repairs, even though it is interested in the building's outside appearance only. I do the inside repairs at my own expense. God bless Mr Bayyumi, our neighbor, who is a master arabesque wood carver. He learned the craft from his father and grandfather, al-Shaykh Isma'il Abu Tahun, may God have mercy on his soul. He was the one who restored the al-Sahimi home in al-Darb al-Asfar."

When asked about leaving the house to preserve our heritage, al-Shu'aybi's widow said, "We will obey the government's order provided the government moves us to a house nearby so my daughter, who works in the Real Estate Administration in al-'Atabah, can go to work [easily] without hardship and provided my grandchildren can go to their schools nearby without difficulty."

Al-Ward [Roses] Mosque

Al-Barquqi Mosque is located on al-Mu'izz Lidin Allah al-Fatimi Street. Area residents say the mosque was built during the age of the Mamelukes. This is the mosque that is known as the Roses Mosque, perhaps because its courtyard is full of roses and flowers. Attached to the mosque are a public fountain, a turkish bath and a religious school called (Qadkhadah) School. Some of the stores that are on all sides of the mosque walls have been leased from the Ministry of Religious Trusts more than 100 years ago and some have been leased from the Department of Antiquities itself. This is what Ahmad Mansur says; he has been a supervisor in the Department of Islamic Antiquities in the area for 26 years.

The Qalawun Community

A group of people who lost their homes either because their homes were demolished or for other reasons find shelter in the Qalawun Community. This consists of a mosque, the mausoleum of Sultan Qalawun and a sanatorium. Bayyumi 'Adli Isma'il says, "Before thinking about the preservation of Islamic monuments, the government must think about a way to maintain the humanity of these families who have been living without shelter for many years. The government must find them appropriate shelter suitable for human habitation."

Al-Basha Palace

There is another magnificent palace that dates back to the age of the Mamelukes. Every stone in that palace is an indication of the authenticity and grandeur of our heritage. This palace is called al-Basha or al-Bashtik Palace. Assaults on the building have been so blatant, they have almost been destructive. [Attached to] the walls of the building are stores housing all kinds of industries: manufacturing water pipes and manufacturing plastic bags used to pack fertilizers. In other stores sackcloth bags and aluminum wares are made. Other stores house coppersmiths; merchants of braids, tassels and trimmings; fruit merchants; contractors; and watch repairmen.

Muhammad Muhammad 'Ali Mahran, a waterpipe manufacturer for 35 years, leases one of these stores [attached to] the wall of the great palace [that dates back to] the age of the Mamelukes. We asked him about the rent he pays for the store. He said, "Why are you asking? Are you asking for tax purposes or are you making a survey?"

We told him, "The Egyptian people want to preserve their heritage. If you were asked to leave this place, what would you do?"

He said, "Before I am asked to leave this place for which I pay my rent regularly to Mrs Muna Isma'il in Ma'adi, I should be given another place. I cannot afford in my state of health and on the income I earn from making waterpipes to start from scratch."

The Story of Mariyan, the Armenian

Even the Armenian Mr Mariyan rents a store in al-Basha Palace. He sits at a special sewing machine for making sacks for fertilizers. Mr Mariyan said, "We pay our rent regularly, and no one can evict us without due cause."

Wikalah al-Jawahirjiyah

Wikalah al-Jawahirjiyah consists of a wall to which wooden closets are attached. In the past these wooden closets were used as safes for merchants. The Ministry of Religious Trusts and the beneficiaries of these trusts lease these spaces; the ministry receives three fourths of the rent, and the beneficiaries receive one fourth. Watch repairman 'Abd-al-Rahman Sa'id says that as an Egyptian citizen he is very sad about what is happening to the historical walls. They are being destroyed as a result of seepage and leaking pipes. He says he is willing to leave the store for which he pays rent for 7 full months of 4 pounds and 950 milliemes to the estates of Sulayman 'Azban and 'Uthman Kanakhdai and three times that amount to the Ministry of Waqf if he can find another place for which he would pay rent suitable to the modest income he earns from his modest work which he began in 1965.

Al-Tawus Lane

In al-Tawus [Peacock] Lane, which is the religious trust of Bashir Agha, Sayyid Ahmad Mahmud, a fruit vendor says, "I am leasing the store, and I am paying three fourths of my rent to the Ministry of Religious Trusts and one fourth to Niyazi,

the beneficiary of the trust. Of course, it would be difficult for us to leave the place. Where would we go when we are paying pennies here compared with what rents are like these days?"

The Travesty of al-Jawhari Mosque

Al-Jawhari Mosque and home were built in 1262 A.H. on an area of 1,750 square meters. The house and the mosque are examples of the authentic Arabic style. They are considered works of art and unique examples of [Arabic architecture]. The Ministry of Religious Trusts sold the mosque at public auction to some merchants for 20,100 pounds. Al-Hajj 'Ali al-Jawhari and Ahmad al-Jawhari, who inherited the property, filed 15 lawsuits against the Ministry of Religious Trusts for wrongfully selling the mosque at a public auction. The heirs actually won their case, and the Department of Antiquities took possession of the mosque and turned it over to the heirs. "We have the right to live here, and we are more capable of preserving the property than any administration is."

Decree Number 283 for 1982 was issued as follows: "After examining Law Number 215 for 1951 protecting antiquities; after examining Presidential Decree Number 2828 for 1971 establishing the Department of Egyptian Antiquities; after examining Presidential Decree Number 150 for 1980 and the amendments and supplementary rulings thereto establishing and organizing the Supreme Council for Culture; after examining the resolution of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Antiquities dated 5 July 1982 approving the registration of al-Jawhari home as an Islamic monument and approving the proposal of the chairman of the board of the Department of Egyptian Antiquities; and according to what the Council of State has presented in its memorandum number 558 dated 22 August 1982 [the following] was resolved:

"Article One: House number 8 on al-Jawhari Lane whose boundaries and buildings are indicated on the survey map attached thereto is to be registered as an Islamic monument.

"Article Two: This decree is to be published in AL-WAQAI' AL-MISRIYAH [The Egyptian Gazette]. Issued on 15 al-Muharram 1402 A.H. (3 November 1982)."

Unfortunately, this happened after the big merchants who had bought the building at auction had vandalized the monument and removed pillars from it.

What about al-Qal'ah [the Citadel] Prison?

Lt Ahmad Salih, an officer in al-Qal'ah Prison says that restoration in the prison area has not yet begun, but restoration has actually begun in Nasir Mosque and in the Muhammad 'Ali Mosque. The prison is almost 200 years old. It was built as a prison in the days of Muhammad 'Ali. The prison will be moved in 1 year to al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah in accordance with the instructions of the minister of the interior.

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INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE AND POLARIZATION IN CAIRO

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 746, 2 May 83 pp 38-41

[Article by Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim: "Spring of Fury"]

[Text] Readers of the Egyptian press in the last weeks cannot avoid the conclusion that the nerves of journalists, writers, lawyers, educated people, artists and men of religion (Muslim and Christian) have become more tense than at any other time since the summer and fall of 1981. The atmosphere of harmony and national reconciliation that prevailed immediately following President Anwar al-Sadat's assassination and throughout 1982 is dissipating with awesome speed in the spring of 1983. It is being replaced by an atmosphere of polarization of opinions, sharpness of positions, hostility and guardedness, exchanges of accusations and verbal clashes involving the harshest and dirtiest of expressions. What is taking place on the Egyptian scene these days is no longer a dialogue or debate about matters great and small; it is more like angry screaming, frenzied monologues and wars of intellectual annihilation. It is indeed a spring of fury.

The "spring of fury" began with the subject of the lawyers' guild law and the struggle between Tawfiq al-Hakim, Dr Zaki Najib Mahmud, Dr Yusuf Idris and Ahmad Baha'-al-Din on one side and some men of religion on the other. It was interspersed by battles about the Muhammad Mahmud Khalil Museum, the matter of Pope Shanudah, and the taking into custody of the artist, actor Sa'id Salih. Then the level of anger jumped several notches in a heated battle about Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's book "The Autumn of Fury."

The Subsidiary Matters and the Pivotal Issue

In our opinion these matters, about which tempers are flaring up and tones of voice are becoming strained, are in the end subsidiary despite their varying degrees of importance. They are different manifestations of one pivotal issue, which is the matter of the fundamental freedoms in Egyptian society. At the head of these are the "freedom of expression" and the "freedom of organization." In this, Egyptian society represents an early introduction to greater historic labor pains that will encompass the entire Arab homeland during the decade of the eighties. Because of the period of decline that has gripped the Arab World since the seventies, which brought us to a low at the start of the eighties, then to an even lower low in the Beirut of 1982,

there is an increasing conviction that getting out of the abyss will not occur except by restoring respect to the Arab human being. This restoring of respect is in turn represented by a respect of the fundamental rights of this human being; the preservation of his humanity; his freedom of expression, organization and political participation; his right to a fair share of his country's wealth in return for his productive work and an opportunity to realize himself and satisfy his basic needs. The yearning for fundamental freedoms on the part of an increasing number of intellectuals and citizens, most of whom are not in positions of authority, is countered by a strong intent on the part of a decreasing number of thinkers and officials, most of whom occupy ruling positions in the systems of authority (the executive, legislative, informational and religious) to muzzle others and restrain their freedom.

Those who long for the basic freedoms sometimes overstep in their overzealousness the thin, weak line between their right to expression and organization on one hand, and the rights of others or the conventions which still dominate society on the other. Those intent on muzzling and fetter tightening sometimes do not hesitate to repeat words of truth with false intent in order to knock out their opponents, incite against them the hostility of the state in this world and promise them fire and damnation in the next.

Among those who long for the basic freedoms there may slip individuals who have themselves slaughtered citizens' freedoms when they were in positions of authority not long ago. Similarly, among those who deny people the right to their freedoms there may be individuals who themselves were proclaiming the sacredness of these freedoms before they reached positions of authority. Despite this, there is a majority yearning for freedom and a dominant minority denying the majority this right under different pretexts and in many ways.

Tawfiq al-Hakim: From Talk With God to Talk With Himself

Tawfiq al-Hakim started a series of articles in the AL-AHRAM newspaper in March with the title "Talks With God." His aim was contemplation and dialogue about questions on being and nature and the greater problems of the age, and from there to go into the concerns of Egypt and the Egyptians. Al-Hakim brought back in these talks with God some of the recollections of his life, which has extended more than 8 decades and has become mixed up with the history of his country. But immediately some men of religion under the leadership of H.E. Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi set out to attack al-Hakim. They considered what he wrote to be "error and delusion" (AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI 17 March 1983) and "lying and drivel" (AL-SHA'B 29 March 1983). More than that was said about al-Hakim, which we abstain from reprinting here. H.E. Shaykh al-Sha'rawi also did not forget to attack Drs Zaki Najib Mahmud and Yusuf Idris. Although they did not claim to talk to or with God they promote, according to him, a "dangerous" intellectual trend that subjects everything to contemplation and questioning!! Shaykh al-Sha'rawi did not recognize the legitimacy of this trend, nor that it is an extension of some of the currents of Islamic thought and practices whether by the Mu'tazalah or in Sufi traditions.

In this heated confrontation the attack by H.E. Shaykh and his supporters concentrated on form rather than substance. Shaykh al-Sha'rawi did not challenge, for example, the intellectual content of the questions raised by al-Hakim in his supposed dialogue with God. Because al-Hakim cares basically for content and has a "message" which he wants to convey to readers, and because he preferred not to enter into peripheral skirmishes with some men of religion, he changed the title of his dialogues from "Talks With God" to "Talks With Myself." That pacified the men of religion for a while. They have not bothered about the content of what al-Hakim wrote under the new title any more than they bothered about the content of what he wrote under the old one.

Dreams of Zaki Najib Mahmud

As for philosopher Zaki Najib Mahmud, he now uses disguise to get his message across to readers. The man who spent more than 60 years preaching science and logic and enlightened thinking found himself forced to return in these bad Arab times to assert axioms and incontestables which have been settled in advanced societies for two centuries. But even in this apparently simple task he often finds himself under fire from the enemies of enlightened thought, in peripheral battles of the kind which most societies have finished with a long time ago. For this reason the man resorts to disguise in the manner of "Kalilah wa Dimnah." The best example of this is what he wrote in the 17 April 1983 issue of AL-AHRAM under the title "To You, Egypt, Is Allegiance," in which he discussed the phenomenon of deification of the ruler in our country--a phenomenon that has often brought on us the ugliest of catastrophes. In the era of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir his supporters used to hail him by repeating, "Soul and blood we sacrifice for you, Jamal." Then with the coming of a new president the call simply changed to "Soul and blood we sacrifice for you, al-Sadat." Our philosopher is alarmed that this cheering has now become "Soul and blood we sacrifice for you, Whoever," despite the fact that it has been automatically repeated and passed on from one president to the next with all the immense differences in the orientation and inclination of these presidents. Zaki Najib Mahmud criticizes this phenomenon, emphasizing that allegiance should not be to individuals, no matter how great they may be, but only to nation and principles. Despite the fact that President Husni Mubarak has frequently and repeatedly expressed his aversion and distaste for such shows and cheers, and although Zaki Najib Mahmud wants to discuss only the matter of "allegiance" without judging or taking a stand toward President Mubarak, he nevertheless resorted to a style of disguise to be on his guard against any misinterpretation of his words and to avoid campaigns of hostility and incitement. He did not mention President Mubarak by name but said, "What raised the question in my mind about allegiance was a television scene in which I saw a group of young men cheering about sacrificing soul and blood in allegiance to whomever sacrifice of souls and blood is being made to. I really felt at that time that something in the scene arouses concern and calls for rectification." The philosopher went to his bed to sleep. He tells us how in his dreams he saw Socrates and a group of his students. Then he saw himself with a group of young men from his village, all discussing the subject of allegiance. This singular journey from Socrates

to the English poet Matthew Arnold to Zaki Najib Mahmud's village--all in order for the man to expound his ideas about allegiance, or more accurately, to avoid misinterpretations of biased people who may race to the ruler's ear to incite and evoke his enmity.

The same thing is done by Tawfiq al-Hakim in one of his talks with himself. This time al-Hakim wishes to promote an idea in which he believes, namely, that a popular nationalist leader should belong to the entire nation and should rise above parties and factionalism (AL-AHRAM 19 April 1983). Al-Hakim resorts in his dialogue with himself to recalling something he had written about the subject in the thirties, i.e., half a century ago. He says, in dialogue with himself, "Yes, I remember. It was my opinion that al-Nahas Pasha abandon the idea of heading al-Wafd [party], leaving it to one of his aides, and be a national leader rather than a party boss." He goes on to tell us how people of ill will misinterpreted his idea and gave al-Nahas Pasha an impression of al-Hakim's bad intentions and of the misguidedness of those who supported his idea. Al-Hakim's self then answers saying, "Indeed, our problem is always the personal side." We thus find that two of our eminent thinkers have been forced into this feverish atmosphere which is inimical to the freedom of opinion and arouses the hostility of the state and its organs. They have been forced to resort to disguise: al-Hakim talks to us through a dialogue with himself, and Zaki Najib Mahmud through his dreams and excursions in the caves of history.

Haykal: From "the Autumn Fury" to the Spring of Fury

Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's book, of which most of us have read one chapter (AL-AHALI, 13 April 1983), aroused a storm of anger among a number of commentators. This book has suddenly and single-handedly raised the level of anger by several degrees in the thermometer of this hot spring season of the Egyptian press. Since the writer of this article, like thousands of others, has not read the book in its entirety, it would be considered violence against truth to comment or take a stand on it. But this is not the fundamental question now. The question is, once more, the freedom of expression. The book, as we understand from the preface and first chapter, is an attempt to apply programs of psycho-history and psycho-politics to the personality of the late president Anwar al-Sadat in order to explain a period of Egypt's history whose ink or blood has not dried yet. The attempt to apply these two programs to the lives of leaders is legitimate, and its evaluation involves three levels. The first is the historical facts and the constant personality, i.e., whatever of these can be verified. The second is the mastery of psychology, social psychology and psychoanalysis. The third is explanation, i.e., relating the historical facts and the constant personality on one hand to the psychological elements and their variations in the leader whose study is undertaken by these two programs, on the other hand. It is in particular the third level, i.e., explanation, which can arouse disagreement more than the others, for here the personality of the author himself enters as one of the factors. If there is reason to believe that the author has aims and inclinations that may influence his interpretations, then the readers have the right, even the duty, to take what the author says about the personality

he writes about with great caution. It is the readers' right and duty to argue with the author and criticize his interpretations. This is in addition to demanding that he establish the correctness of the historical and political facts he cites and demonstrate his mastery of the programs he uses.

All this has been mentioned and is reasonable and required, but this is one thing, and the attempt to crucify the writer is something else. In principle it does not matter to us that the writer is an eminent journalist who occupied the throne of the Egyptian and Arab press for many years, nor that the book is about a departed president who ruled Egypt for 11 years and took part in her major events for more than a quarter of a century. What matters to us is the question of the fundamental freedoms, foremost among which is the freedom of expression. The writer may have erred; he may have misinterpreted events; he may have distorted Egypt's reputation or offended some values deeply rooted in our society. He may have done all this, but who is the one to decide if he indeed has done it or not?

Do we, as part of public opinion, decide it? How can we do that while the book is banned from circulation, and publishing it in installments is prohibited?

Does another writer decide that for us, Egyptian public opinion? In other words, do we accept the tutelage of someone to think for us, read and interpret for us? The principle of tutelage would be considered if Egyptian public opinion were incapable, and if the tutelary were chosen by legitimate means!

If public opinion is incapable of reading, thinking, interpreting or judging, then why is it incited and mobilized, and its hostility evoked to participate in crucifying a writer who wrote what this same public opinion cannot read?

If the writer, as we are told, has made light of people's minds and employed his pen in distorting the late president's reputation and consequently that of Egypt, then do not the tutelaries who read and interpret and judge for us also make light of our minds? Do they not distort the reputation of an entire people when they suggest to the world that our people are intellectually under age and that consequently it is necessary to ration what they are allowed to read?

The remedy for overstepping the bounds in exercising the freedom of opinion and expression, assuming the bounds have been overstepped, cannot be by slaughtering this freedom--or else we will be like those who kill the patient to cure his disease!

Also assuming there is a patient, the remedy for overstepping the bounds in religious *ijtihad* [independent judgment] and practice cannot be by murdering religious freedom or doing away with religion.

The basic problem is not in what Tawfiq al-Hakim says, or Zaki Najib Mahmud, or Yusuf Idris, or Ahmad Baha'-al-Din, or Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. The

basic problem is the absence of the fundamental liberties. It is in imposing tutelage on the minds and hearts of people, in the failure to recognize that the Egyptian people have been over the initial stages for many years. The tutelaries want nevertheless to keep them a prisoner in chains, and to persuade them that they are incapable of thinking, incapable of organizing and sharing in the shaping of their own destiny and future.

Inquisitions and Dung Heaps of History

No one remembers the names of those who imposed themselves as tutelaries in ancient Athens and decided on behalf of its people to execute its philosopher Socrates for his ideas. They said more than 2,000 years ago that these ideas were error and delusion, corrupting the youth and confusing minds. But all humanity remembers Socrates and recognizes the great debt owed to him by human thought. Nobody remembers the names of those who sentenced Galileo to death because he said the earth was round, but all the world remembers him and celebrates his role in the scientific revolution that has altered the destiny of mankind.

But why go so far? Who of us remembers the names of those who accused our own thinker Taha Husayn of blasphemy and atheism, ordered the burning of his book about pre-Islamic poetry, evoked the enmity of the state and aroused the basest of rabble instincts against him? No one remembers their names, but everyone remembers Taha Husayn and celebrates his gifts to Arabic thought and literature. The same is true of the brothers Ali and Mustafa Abd-al-Raziq, and of others of our writers and thinkers who were exposed to violence in their time.

Those who muzzle people, tighten chains and arouse the basest of rabble instincts may imagine that the world obeys them. But power does not last. Very probably it is they who will end up on the dung heaps of history, pursued by the curses of peoples.

Return of Fascist Mentality

Two months ago I wrote an article with the title "Remnants of Fascism in Egypt," in which I cautioned against subdued, scattered phenomena which at that time were trying to suffocate the freedom of opinion and *ijtihad*, and stamp everyone who disagrees with them as "traitor," "agent," "blasphemer" or "atheist." I asked then at the end of the article whether those were the remnants of fascism still entrenched from years of former absolute rule, or the return to a fascist mentality trying to impose itself on society again. The transformation of this spring to a "spring of fury" in the Egyptian press in the weeks following the writing of the above mentioned article suggests that what I observed at that time was not "remnants" dawdling from previous times but early, dark portents of the return of the absolute fascist mentality. I hope my reading of what is happening proves wrong. And I sincerely wish to God that the forces of good in Egypt will consolidate their determination and inaugurate anew an atmosphere of reconciliation and harmony--with lots of freedom, democracy, and tolerance.

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REASONS FOR CRISIS IN EDUCATION CITED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 19 Mar 83 p 4

[Article by Rif'at Fayyad: "We Are Losing 40 Million Pounds because Students Are Failing in Secondary School; Private Lessons, Examinations and Curricula Are Reasons"]

[Text] Egypt is losing 40 million pounds because students in secondary public schools are failing and dropping out of school. This amount is close to the sum earmarked by the state every year for secondary education. This loss is in addition to the loss borne by families and by society because students fail and drop out of school. To put it more accurately, it has become evident that we are losing every 3 years the equivalent of a full year's budget allocation for the various stages of education.

These are the results of a most serious study that was made about public secondary education. This study, a thesis submitted by a candidate for a master's degree, was discussed at the College of Education at al-Zaqaziq University. Tharwat 'Abd-al-Baqi Ahmad Habib, an assistant instructor at the university was awarded a master's degree. [The study was completed] under the supervision of Dr Ibrahim Mutawi', dean of the College of Education in Tanta and Dr Nabih Muhammad Hammudah, associate professor in the College of Education in al-Zaqaziq.

The researcher followed a whole class of students attending public secondary schools throughout the republic to find out the standards of success among them in each grade and in the grade in which they earn a public secondary school certificate. He wanted to find out the number of students who had failed and dropped out throughout the period of study. He wanted to find out the magnitude of the loss that is caused by students failing and dropping out. At the same time he also studied this phenomenon throughout al-Sharqiyah Governorate.

The study revealed serious reasons that are causing an increase in the percentage of students failing and dropping out during this stage where the success rate is now between 50 and 60 percent. This means a loss of between 50 and 40 percent of the human capital that is invested. It became evident that the costs for one student in public secondary education for 1 year exceeds 300 pounds.

What are these reasons that are causing these results?

The study states that the foremost of these reasons are the curricula themselves and textbooks. Textbooks are not clear, and they are written in a difficult language. Textbooks do not take into account the special needs of students. Subjects in textbooks are not sequential and do not progress from the easy to the difficult. Curricula standards are [generally] above those of students.

Improper Examinations

The study states that examinations are presented as a means by which the productivity of education can be evaluated. In their present condition, however, examinations are not sufficient for the evaluation process because conditions make evaluating examination results more suspicious. This is due to the (tension) that teachers, students and parents undergo during examinations. This makes the process of evaluating students imprecise because examinations now measure quantity but not quality. There are no fixed criteria for writing examinations. Examination questions may come from outside the curriculum, and they may be difficult and long.

Private Lessons

There are other factors behind students' failing and dropping out of school, and these are associated with the students' social, economic and personal conditions. Among these factors is the fact that residence conditions may make students unable to study. In addition, families may show little or no interest in the success or failure of students. Poor relations between parents and continuous pressure from families on students to study are [two other reasons]. Students may fail because they work during the school year as a result of the fact that their families' monthly income is small. Students may also fail because they are not getting private lessons.

What Is the Solution?

At the end of his study the researcher offered a set of proposals that would reduce this loss in education. Among these proposals are those that have to do with teachers' training, textbooks and examination systems. Curricula are to contain materials that would be relevant and useful to students when they leave school. This would come about only by devising a well-considered educational plan that effects a balance between various demands.

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PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH GROWING TREND OF PRIVATE LESSONS DISCUSSED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 16 May 83 p 6

[Article by Rif'at Khalid: "How To Prevent Private Lessons from Turning into a Plague That Could Destroy Free Education; Who Is Responsible for this Phenomenon? Students, Teachers or the Education Policy?"]

[Text] The phenomenon of private lessons in schools and universities has become widespread; it has almost eroded free education. Sometimes this phenomenon became widespread behind the scenes, but most of the times it became widespread publicly. Egyptian households are now suffering from this phenomenon of private lessons which is adding to the burdens of life these households have to bear.

What are the reasons for this phenomenon? How can it be confronted, and how can its danger be limited?

Dr Yahya Shahin, president of al-Minya University says, "[The prevalence of] private lessons is an environmental disease that manifested itself with present conditions as a result of the educational policy we've had in the past 30 years. In order to satisfy the public, the state provided education for them, but it did not expand construction of sites and equipment that could accommodate these large numbers of students. Students were thus crowded into classes; educational standards declined; and students had to resort to private lessons. Circumstances dictated that students seek private lessons just as they dictated that teachers seek them to earn money. If the number of colleges is increased in every governorate, and if every student is educated in his governorate, private lessons as a phenomenon would disappear. It is known that there are no private lessons in al-Minya University because we have few students and we do not have any crowding in any college at the university."

Dr 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Fattah, vice president of al-Mansurah University says, "Private lessons are prohibited by the University Organization Act. We are trying to curtail them by using remedial classes. People who teach these classes which consist of between 10 and 20 students are compensated. The classes are set up in the colleges, and they are supervised by the faculty. Teachers who teach these remedial classes receive 80 percent of the returns. The problem with private lessons may be attributed to the low income of teachers who turn to private lessons [to boost their earnings]. A reconsideration of salary schedules is required so that teachers' salaries can provide faculty members with a decent living."

The vice president of al-Mansurah University clarifies an important point. It is the universities' admissions policy that is responsible for the phenomenon of private lessons becoming widespread. The large number of students is more than what college resources can handle. This is more evident in the theoretical colleges than it is in the practical colleges. This situation causes students to look for ways whereby they can have access to information, that is private lessons. In my opinion, treating the problem means reconsidering the universities' admissions policy and advancing education."

Dr Hasan Mustafa, vice president of Tanta University says, "[The need for] private lessons does not arise unless there are large numbers of students. At Tanta University private lessons are not common, and the reason for that is the small number of students at Tanta University."

Dr Hikmat Husni al-Rifa'i, assistant instructor at the College of Education at al-Minya University says, "Private lessons are considered a sickness that must be eliminated. The proposed solution for the problem of private lessons lies in having a school set up remedial classes for students and select competent teachers to teach these different subjects."

Dr Muhammad 'Ali Nasr, dean of the College of Education at al-Minya University says, "If we were to analyze the reasons for the phenomenon of private lessons, we would find them to be numerous. Among those reasons, for example, is the absence in schools of educational devices or tools. Parents feel that private lessons help their children go to college. Vocational education and technical schools are lagging behind universities. Teachers and their private gain also have an effect on the lessons they give. In the classroom they teach one way, and in private lessons they teach another way. The large number of students in a classroom is also responsible for the existence of private lessons. One may add to this the fact that some teachers are not qualified: they lack the educational qualifications, and they are not capable of conducting the educational process."

Muhammad Ahmad 'Ali 'Abd-al-'Al, a first grade secondary school teacher in Cairo's north educational district, and Husni Amin al-Nashar, director of al-Tabari Model Secondary School in Misr al-Jadidah say that the ideal solution for eliminating private lessons lies in maintaining [a certain] number of students in a class; devoting the greatest possible attention to educational materials; and upgrading the material standards of teachers to make them comparable to the standards of other positions in the state. [What is required] is at least doubling teachers' salaries. That condition [alone] can do away completely with the problem of private lessons.

Fawzi 'Abd-al-Zahir, first undersecretary of the Ministry of Higher Education says, "Private lessons are forbidden by law in the educational process. Any faculty member who is 'caught' giving private lessons is questioned and legal measures are taken with him. In general, remedial classes provide the tools that help strengthen students' educational standards."

I asked a female student at Cairo University what she thought about private lessons. Nivin Mustafa Fahmi, who is a student in the College of Pharmacy said, "I do not believe in them because going to classes regularly and concentrating [on the subject matter] with the professor would be enough to enable a student to

earn the highest grades." We should know that Nivin earns the grade, "very good" every year because she relies on herself and not on private lessons.

Finally, education experts agree on a prescription that would eliminate the problem of private lessons and curtail them in schools and in the university. This prescription consists of setting forth and providing the necessary resources in the schools; devoting attention to vocational education, making it no less important than university education; strengthening basic education as a starting point for devoting attention to vocational education; and letting students acquire skills. Another suggestion was made to devise a permanent program for rating teachers that would be objective and stay away from subjectivity. Rating principles are to be devised so that teacher promotions would be tied to the efforts they make to realize the necessary educational goals in the teaching process. Schools are to set up remedial classes for students provided that these classes are taken seriously, that students keep up with them and that competent teachers are chosen to teach them. The students themselves are to be consulted to find out what they think about the teachers who are teaching these remedial classes. The process of admissions in schools and universities is to be set on the right course so that the number of students in the educational system would not be increased at the expense of the quality of education.

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SUPPLY CARD SYSTEM REVIEWED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 16 May 83 p 3

[Article by Layla Hafiz and Samir Bakir: "New Supply Card To Be Issued Next Month; New Card Is an Attempt To Set Right Course for Subsidy"]

[Text] Setting the right course for subsidies and ensuring that they reach those who deserve them is an important issue that many people have previously called for. Economists affirm that new classes of people have emerged in society and that the need to reconsider the subsidies they are receiving has become urgent and essential since this group of people can pay the free market prices to buy what they need.

In light of that fact economic studies on subsidies were begun. Some people asked that subsidies be abolished once and for all, and others asked that they be maintained. The matter was finally settled by issuing [new] supply cards that people will begin taking out next month.

The question is this: Will the new card help set the right course for subsidies and ensure that they reach those who deserve them? Accordingly, will the new card put an end to the long lines of black market merchants?

At the outset officials affirm that the new supply cards constitute an attempt to set the right course for subsidies for staple foods that are issued to people by virtue of the cards. This is part of a general plan to set the right course for subsidies all over the state. Decree Number 51 for 1983 was therefore issued comprising expanding the categories of people whose incomes exceed that which is considered a fixed income. These groups can manage to do without receiving the fully subsidized food staples. They can get the food staples they get with the supply cards in the same quantities that are in effect now, but they can pay the free market price for them. It is known that these free market prices are also subsidized, but the subsidies are partial.

Muhammad Fakhri Isma'il, general supervisor of distribution and supply cards in the Ministry of Supply says, "The constitution provided equal rights for every citizen. Therefore, the groups that are excluded [from obtaining the fully subsidized goods] will obtain the goods, but they will pay for them the free market price that is partially subsidized. For example, the free market price for sugar and oil, products that are partially subsidized, is 30 piasters; this is

much less than the [actual] cost of these two products. This is true of the rest of the goods: those like sugar and [cooking] oil that are distributed according to centrally determined quotas, or those that are sold on the basis of supply card instructions such as rice, beans, lentils and other goods that are determined from time to time.

Eleven categories of people will not be receiving fully subsidized goods. These are the owners of commercial stores and tourist establishments; transportation companies; owners of import and export offices; trade agents; contractors; and factory and workshop owners who are licensed to practice their professions by authorized government agencies.

--Professionals who are members of professional associations and who graduated over 15 years ago and have been engaged in private practice, even if they are government or public sector employees. This includes people who are subject to special decrees and their families.

--Those who jointly with their spouses and dependent children own more than 10 feddans of farm land or fruit orchards, provided that this land has been assessed for a land tax.

--Individuals who are on loan or who have contracts to work abroad and emigres and their families.

--Employees of companies [subject to] the investment law and their families, except custodians and guards.

--Employees of international organizations and foreign companies in Egypt; employees of the Arab League and of the League of Islamic Nations; and employees of foreign schools and universities that have branches in Egypt and their families.

--Employees of embassies, consulates and diplomatic representation offices in Egypt and their families.

--People who pay a general income tax and their families.

--Landlords who earn from their property net rent that exceeds 2,000 pounds a year and their families.

--Owners of private cars whose engines are bigger than 4 cylinder engines and their families.

--People who own two or more private cars and their families.

Red supply cards will be issued to people in these categories.

Green cards will be issued to people who are not in these categories. These people will receive the fully subsidized food staples. This is based on the fact that these groups of people have fixed incomes and do in fact deserve to get the fully subsidized goods.

The general inspector of distribution went on to say, "It is expected that the new cards will be issued to people starting 1 June 1983. They will be issued over a period of 6 months. Then a date will be announced when the new cards will go into effect and when goods will be sold on the basis of the ordinary cards as well.

"Consideration has been given to the fact that the sale of staple foods according to current cards continue while the new cards are being issued so that book-keeping operations can be regulated until a decision is made setting the date for selling the staple goods on the basis of the new cards."

Muhammad Fakhri had this to say about how this system will be applied in the various governorates. "A decree was issued forming a high-level supply card committee to oversee and follow up on the implementation of the new system in the 26 governorates of the country. The committee will function out of 350 supply offices scattered throughout the country. Timetables and performance rate schedules have been set for each office in accordance with the number of supply grocery stores that are subordinate to each office and the number of supply cards that are allocated to those grocery stores. The decree left it up to local supply offices to draw up the local executive program for each office for the purpose of issuing the supply cards that are allocated to each office during the set period of time so as to make it easy for citizens to take out the new cards."

The steps for taking out the new supply cards are as follows.

Upon paying 150 milliemes, the cost of taking out a supply card, citizens receive an [application] form for a supply card from the grocery store where they purchase their food supplies. Citizens would then fill out these forms with information comparable to that which appears on their civil [registration] cards and [current] supply cards. People in the [11] excluded categories would sign a declaration on the back of these forms. In this case citizens would not be required to provide confirmation of their classification. Every citizen who voluntarily requests a red card [making him eligible to receive] partial subsidies [on staple foods] is not required to provide confirmation of his classification. But if a citizen is qualified to receive a green card for full subsidies, it is his responsibility to provide confirmation of that fact from those agencies that will be identified at the grocery stores selling these staple foods.

Regarding partial subsidy supply cards and the attitude those who have the cards have toward them, the supervisor says, "The partial subsidy supply card will not be affected. It will be incorporated with the new card under one cover to prevent people from receiving food staples from two locations. The partial subsidy supply card will continue to be used in stores that presently exist in the state's administrative agency units, in departments, organizations and companies.

Dr Husayn al-Faqir of the National Institute for Planning and author of a special study on the new supply card system had this to say about the new supply card system, about the opinion that professors of planning have of the system and about what the system will offer the Egyptian consumer. "The new supply card is being put into effect on the basis of a broad field study conducted in 18 governorates and 412 villages by the National Institute of Planning, the International Institute for Food Policy Research in Washington and the Institute for Agricultural Policy Research in West Germany."

Dr Husayn al-Faqir says the new system will ensure that consumers get the goods at the official subsidized prices. On the other hand, the new system will try to hold back the subsidy from groups of people that are excluded from receiving full subsidies. The new system will also serve rural and urban consumers. Rural consumers will be assured of getting their supply rations without having to resort to the black market. It will also make farmers turn to the production of basic crops such as wheat, beans, lentils and rice. This is because these products are not included on the supply cards for subsidized goods. Consequently, farmers will try to increase their production [of these goods] to ensure that they get their shares. The new system will try to reduce the hardships urban consumers have to endure by standing in lines for many hours at cooperative grocery stores. The new system will do away with exploitation by middlewomen and by those who make their living by taking advantage of and benefiting from the weak controls we have on food supplies.

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TAWFIQ AL-HAKIM, HAYKAL DISCUSS CONTROVERSY OVER LATTER's BOOK

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 4 May 83 pp 7, 8

[Article: "Exchange of Letters Between Tawfiq al-Hakim and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal: 'A Letter From Tawfiq al-Hakim Which AL-AHRAM Refused To Publish'"]

/Text/ From Tawfiq al-Hakim to Haykal

Tawfiq al-Hakim wrote this open letter to Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal and submitted it to our colleague Salah Muntasir for publication in AL-AHRAM. However, AL-AHRAM refused to publish it, and Mr Tawfiq al-Hakim sent it to AL-AHALI, for publication on its pages.

I believe you are sure that I do not agree with your political writing, because you reminisce about the disputes that took place between us when we met at sessions of the board of directors of AL-AHRAM, when I would direct violent attacks against you, then the meeting would end with us going out arm in arm smiling and laughing, to take a meal together. This is because our relationship is based on two things, fixed matters and variables. The fixed things are affection and love, while the variables are opinions on politics and so forth. We do not confuse the two. I am writing to you today, motivated by this affection and love, to calm your nerves. I am doing so specifically for one reason, because my situation resembles yours. You wrote a book, "Autumn of Fury," which has been considered an attack on al-Sadat after his death. I wrote a book, "The Return of Awareness," which was considered an attack on 'Abd-al-Nasir after his death. The fury, in your case, is explained by the fact that he put you in prison. As for me, 'Abd-al-Nasir did not put me in prison! To the Arab world, there remains only one explanation: a "lack of allegiance," or perhaps "hypocrisy," vis-a-vis another era. Today, also, the world is rising up against me for another piece of writing, which, it has been said, is against almighty God. I am now in a state of isolation which you are familiar with: with no wife or child, I am living with God and asking him for salvation, and they have said that this request for salvation is wayward and disruptive and have expelled me from God's paradise, anarchical letters have rained down on me, and even some intelligent persons are having pity on my mind, which has gone, and on the autumn which has come with old age. All that concerns me, as far as you and I are concerned, is the lack of respect for "free opinions." Write your opinion and let me write mine. It is not necessary that I like your opinion, or that you like mine; the important thing is that the two opinions exist.

More important is that the society be devoid of a single authority dominating through a single point of view, which can silence every voice besides itself. In stories and tales of old, it was related to us that the king had two ministers, one on his right, the minister of the right hand, and a minister on his left or to his north, the minister of the left hand as we would call him, laughing. We did not ask about the area of specialization of each minister. Today, I would like the minister of the right hand to be the minister supporting the ruler, and the minister of the left hand to be the minister of the opposition, with the ruler listening attentively to each and deriving his own opinion after examining the two views with the utmost care and probity. I told the venerable paramount religious leaders who visited me in my office in AL-AHRAM to ask about the real nature of my position on religion, God and accountability, and I told them, "As long as there is accountability in the hereafter, I am confident, because accountability means having a court in which I will be permitted to express my defense, because every charge must have a defense, and, in the final resting place, the accounting must be held in an atmosphere of tranquility and purity which will let the defense be heard. On earth, however, anarchical voices, sometimes accompanied by new sounds of explosives, make the sound of the defense come out in a stifled form which provokes laughter and ridicule more than mercy and regret. We have patience, and from me you have the fixed quality in our life--affection and love.

To Tawfiq al-Hakim From Muhammad Hasanayn Hakal

Your words which you sent to me via AL-AHALI have reached me. You reminded me of our bygone days, days when the dialogue between us went on uninterrupted--a literary man and a journalist, each with his own different opinion and his own view of people, circumstances and history. I consider that you have not changed very much, and I hope that I for my part have changed only to the extent that experience, events and time have taken from me and given to me.

Do you remember the stories of "the times," even before the experience of AL-AHRAM brought us together? Do you remember the days when I was a young journalist and you were a big literary figure whom people would point to, and between us there were what you have called the fixed things--"affection and love?" We were both perhaps drawn to the other by the nature of difference in character and orientations. You searched truth through the inspiration of art, and I searched for it in the vast sea of events. At that time we would eat lunch together every day; one time you would invite me, and once I would invite you, to even out the bill; you were always precise about the bills--you had rules regarding them which provoked and still do provoke my amazement, or should I say my admiration. You set out a law on bills between us. While the invitation was at your expense one day, your condition was firm; if I wanted to choose the restaurant where we would eat, you would choose the dish I would order. If I had the right to choose the dish, you were the one who would choose the restaurant. Thus, you were assured of controlling the budget in all circumstances.

You still are the way you were as regards your bills and your laws. By your statement, I imagined that you wanted to invite me to lunch with you, and here you were, with your extreme intelligence, inviting me to invite you. You yourself were choosing the restaurant and the dishes and forgetting all the checks.

In any event, welcome. I say that contentedly and happily. You know that I have a weakness toward you which I cannot overcome, and perhaps I do not want to.

Nonetheless, perhaps you will permit me some observations over your statement, bearing in mind that I had decided, after my interview with AL-AHALI last week, not to join in a controversy which I know in advance will be sterile.

Would you believe that I do not read much of what is being published about me now-a-days? I know the purpose behind it, I know the people involved in it, and I cast a rapid glance at the angry pages and once again remember the statement by George Bernard Shaw: "They are talking. What are they saying? Let them talk!"

I am confident that you will believe that, because I am confident that you know me.

Let me move on to my observations about your statement:

First, let me draw a distinction between "The Return of Awareness," which you wrote about Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and my book "Autumn of Fury," which was not about Anwar al-Sadat. I still decline to address myself to a book centered around Anwar al-Sadat, because I believe that the story on him is still close at hand, and it is not easy to deal with it in the abstract. That is what I did with the story on Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. If you will read the introduction to the Arabic edition of my book, you will find this contention in complete, detailed form.

Of course you have not read "Autumn of Fury," nor have others, yet. Up to this moment, less than half of it has appeared in all the newspapers of the world; the English edition appeared a few days ago, and only 10 copies of that have reached Egypt--all of which I gave to a group of friends so that they would be au courant, as is sometimes said. I do not imagine that any of them have had the opportunity yet to read the book in full.

It appears to me, from your statement, that you have interpreted "Autumn of Fury" as meaning my fury over being taken to a prison cell, and having its door locked on me. Let me, with your permission and consent, correct that. It was not an autumn of fury because I was angry. Nature simply is not a question of the mood or attitude of an individual. The autumn of fury, in my book, was the events that took place between September and October of 1981, until the fury became a tempest which raged over the nation, from one end to the other.

Let me explain to you the idea behind my book, so that the difference between it and your book may become clear to you.

I started with an angry president. You remember how impatient and excitable he was, may God have mercy on him. Thousands of people in detention by decree, hundreds dismissed from the universities and newspapers, storms crashing down on the houses of God, mosques and churches, decrees, speeches and conferences, all heated to the boiling point--a constant attack against people who did not have the right of reply and defense, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din the new Louis 16th, Fathi Radwan, a lofty sheikh who had lost his venerability after 70, I, an "atheist," as I confessed to him, May God forgive him, Shaykh al-Mahallawi, "thrown in prison like

a dog." The president was angry. To explain the reasons for his anger, I tried to get close to the keys of a personality. I did not adopt psychological analysis as a single criterion for understanding history, but I relied on it, as people do all over the world, as one of a number of instruments. That was the first part of my book; five chapters.

The masses of the Egyptian people were angry. In reality, they had been angry since January 1977, when they discovered through practical reality that their sacrifices on the bridges of the crossing had turned into bank deposits belonging to people who had not been there on the bridges.

There was a group of interrelated, complex crises: inflation, housing, communications, the media talking about what it did not know about, and so forth. There were the liberalization and the constant provocations that led to. Then the new political and social options in Egypt resulted in strategic upheavals throughout the region and throughout the worldwide struggle. All these were issues which I dealt with through analysis and in detail.

That was the second part of my book, five chapters also.

There was Islam, the religion of freedom, justice and equality. That is the third part of my book, as a witness on the stage of anger. Intense groups turned to Islam in moments of profound anxiety, asking questions of it, seeking inspiration from it, and searching in its embrace for the lost truth between the ideal and reality. Thus I abandoned myself to a long investigation of Islamic fundamentalism, from its first sources to the modern era, from Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyah to Hasan al-Banna and Abu-al-A'la al-Mawdudi.

The Coptic Church was angry. It had been faced with matters for which there was no valid reason, especially when Pope Shannudah, adhering to the great traditions of the Patriarchate of Egypt, was not happy when the seat of the Diocese of Mark was turned into a political instrument in the hands of the ruling powers.

Thus I dealt with the story of the national church of Egypt from the days of the famous meeting of Caledonia and Archbishop Athanasios the First up to the day of the banishment of Pope Shannudah to a monastery in the middle of the desert at Wadi al-Natrun, reviewing, in the course of all this, the history of this church and its role throughout the ages. I related one aspect of the reasons for the intense clash between the angry president and the pope who became angry.

I was not talking about the experience of a subjective fury--I was talking about the experience of an objective fury, not the anger of a person, but the anger of social, political, religious and intellectual forces, a violent clash which had the motivations, strong partisans and currents, and not just a person who imprisoned himself in the prison of his own self, whether through selfishness or prison!

When that autumn of September and October 1981 came, fury was in every spirit and in every place. The president was angry, the people were angry, the mosque was

angry, the church was angry, and the storms charged with electricity came, then collided in that autumn of 1981. That clash was the subject of the fifth part of the book, five chapters also.

The sixth and final part of the book was the thunderstorm of the clash of charged storms over the podium. What happened? How did it happen? What? Who? When? Then, where do we go from here?

Thus "Autumn of Fury" was something other than what it seemed to you, and thus differs from your book.

Your book was an evaluation of an era from your point of view.

As for my book, that was an examination of an incident, from the standpoint of my own studies.

You issued verdicts on a man and on policies, which I did not do. Rather, I took from the man and the policies just what was necessary to arrive at a certain point in time and place, 1210 hours in the afternoon of Tuesday 5 October 1981.

This observation has been a lengthy one, but it was necessary.

There is a second observation, which also makes "Autumn of Fury" different from "The Return of Awareness." We were together, and you know the details.

Since 1971, that is, after just a year of President al-Sadat's rule, my differences with him began, but they were all at that time differences of individual judgment, or so they seemed to me. It was necessary that he have the final opinion, in his capacity as the person responsible for the decisionmaking power.

Nonetheless, perhaps you will remember sharp differences that arose between him, may God have mercy on him, and me. You of course remember the crisis of the declaration by the literary figures, at the beginning of 1973, and the wholesale transfer of journalists to the Information Department. You remember that I declined to carry out that decree within the confines of AL-AHRAM, for which I was responsible at that time, and you will remember that after a discussion in which people's voices became loud I told him, "The solution for us is to produce a piece of white paper on which he would write a decree terminating me from AL-AHRAM, or on which I would write my letter of resignation." You remember that; I do not want to burden people with the details of it, or speak at excessive length on matters that there no longer is any need for.

You also remember that the dispute with him reached a parting of the ways with the first separation of forces. You undoubtedly remember that you spoke to me more than once about the results and consequences. I can swear to you that I was sincere in this advice, but the issue was bigger than anything else. I believed that Egypt and the Arab nation had made a tremendous effort to achieve an unquestionable victory, /al-Sadat's/ policy was incapable of benefiting from the miracle achieved by arms, and the results might be terrifying and horrible.

Thus I left AL-AHRAM on 1 February 1974, and did not return to it or to any other position in the press or in the government.

I did not leave and be quiet, but I took my cause with me and spoke. My constant talk, starting in February 1974, was what later, in September 1981, led me to prison, within the tempests of the autumn of fury.

Here "The Return of Awareness," which was issued 3 years after the death of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, differs from my book, "Autumn of Fury," and consequently the conditions differ and are not similar.

I did not write after anyone's death. I wrote my opinion during his lifetime. I wrote the conclusions of my study of what had happened after his death. He, may God have mercy on him, did not die of a disease in bed, nor of an accident on the road; rather, he went back to his lord in the framework of a tragic violent bloody spectacle which the whole world saw in color, pictures and sound. It was necessary to make an attempt to understand what went on behind the bloody tragic spectacle on the podium, and to investigate the reasons which led to it.

Related to that, here, is a third observation which I consider delicate but basic.

Your book "The Return of Awareness" was issued in the climate of a general attempt in the Arab world to re-evaluate Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and look at him anew. Here I am not concerned about who made the effort or what the objective was; that is all beside the point. Rather, the important thing is that there was an attempt.

My book "Autumn of Fury" was not directed at the Arab world. Otherwise, I would have written it in Arabic, which is of course my native language. I stated before, and have stated repeatedly, that, from the first moment of the experience of my arrest, I felt that I was more an observer of what was going on than one of its victims, and I felt that one day I would write about the experience of imprisonment and prison. That was not "Autumn of Fury." When you read this book, and perhaps that will happen some day, you will discover that the entire experience of prison did not take up more than two pages of the book, in volume, while the book itself is more than 600 pages. The idea of "Autumn of Fury" came to me in prison, true, but it came when the tempests of the autumn had subsided and gone, and I had realized, as had others, that the nature of things would open new doors. I proceeded to think about my work as a journalist, the idea of "Autumn of Fury" occurred to me, and I talked about it to some of the comrades of this experience that was being lived through.

I calculated in advance--and this is the journalist's sense--that when I left, the group of international publishers which holds the rights to my books would ask me for a book on what had happened. The assassination of Anwar al-Sadat on television appeared as an incomprehensible enigma to them: how could what had happened happen to a star of the peace process that had attracted their attention?

What I had calculated in advance indeed happened.

Thus, the attempt to write "Autumn of Fury" for the outer world, not for the Arab world, was an attempt to explain what went on. I would like to underline the phrase "explain what went on." I say "explain," not "justify," what went on. Even if we look at the whole case as a murder, the crime is not just the firing of a shot, but rather circumstantial conditions, preludes, motives, provocation, planning, arrangements, and extensive long stories.

The book, then, was directed to the outer world, not the Arab world. It was not part of an attempt to re-evaluate a man or review his role. I think you know that since the month of October 1979 I have not written a single article for an Arabic newspaper, and consequently I have not received rights from any Arab publisher. It may surprise you to learn that I did that in response to a request from President al-Sadat. The request was not to me, but it was made of everyone writing in the Arab world. Although I was not the person at issue, I preferred to commit myself to the request, to ward off touchy feelings and interpretations that I found I could do without. In spite of all my warm friendships with many Arab publishers, I nonetheless asked them all to appreciate my position, and they did.

It occurred to me, of course, that some of them would try to obtain the Arabic publication rights to the book "Autumn of Fury," but I did not pause long before this possibility, and in fact the Lebanese publisher who obtained the Arabic language rights was not the same as the one whom I had imagined would have priority in obtaining these rights.

The Arabic translation of "Autumn of Fury" began in Beirut, at a great distance from me, and the translation into dozens of other languages began. However, I asked the Lebanese publisher and friend to be so kind as graciously to let me read a copy of the translation, because of the sensitive nature of the book. Although the great professor who started translating the first chapters exerted an effort on them that merits appreciation, I, out of loyalty to the Arab reader, and in the interests of care and accuracy, asked the Lebanese publisher to allow me to translate my book into Arabic myself. It may surprise you that I did that without receiving a single piaster for a job to which I devoted 2 whole months, full time. To be honest, the Lebanese publisher did give me six boxes of cigars, which I accepted with thanks, and the matter ended.

Thus you can see that "Autumn of Fury" was part of one context while "The Return of Awareness" was part of a different one. The former was primarily for the foreign world, and its appearance in the Arab world was merely incidental, while the context of the latter was Arab, in terms of circumstances, climate, re-evaluation of people and review of their roles.

Thus when I read you telling me in your statement "my situation is similar to yours," I remembered your rules about the bill, and I remembered them with admiration!

A fourth and final observation concerns my talk about "Autumn of Fury" and your talk with God, your talk to God, or your talk with yourself, according to the different titles which have appeared in different versions of it.

You have the inspired, innovative imagination of an artist, which can put you on the wings of eagles and cause you to fly in the high heavens, but I have not approached that broad vastness: I know my limits. An artist is one thing and a journalist is something different. The former has the horizons of the stars which the wings of eagles carry him toward, while the place of the latter is on earth, in the midst of its vicissitudes, borders, and byways, searching, investigating, exploring, analyzing, comparing and deducing. Thus his whole case is here, and not there in the horizons of the stars, and the people who discuss with him, converse with him or even judge him must put the whole case before all the people.

On the subject of cases, I heard about a play titled "A Witness Who Didn't See Anything," which it was my misfortune not to be able to see. I think this is the first time we are hearing about a play titled "A Judge Who Didn't See Anything," which I have not read and studied, which we are seeing in front of us now. We have seen some acts of it, and some of its acts are being played out.

I say this to reassure you about my nerves. You tell me that so far you have been writing to calm them down. You can be reassured, my great and precious friend: my nerves are in good condition; how are yours? You know, and God's knowledge is greater than ours, that it was one of my happiest days when I managed to convince you to join us at the experiment in AL-AHRAM. The bird was frightened in its cage, and I imagine that you can see that there was no cage. Let me remind you, my friend, that you wrote some of the greatest of your splendid works at that time. Do you remember the day you gave me the manuscript of your story "The Anxiety Bank?" It was a direct, violent criticism of the excesses of power in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir. Your awareness was not absent.

Do you remember that day you gave me the manuscript, and told me that you had not written it for publication, but that you had written it as an experiment? You remember what my position was. I told you that AL-AHRAM would publish it without hesitation, which was its duty. At that time, also, our mutual, genuine friend, Najib Mahfuz, wrote his famous critical stories, "The Pigeon and the Fall" and "The Thief and the Dogs." AL-AHRAM published them all, as it published much else beside that, not in the form of stories but in direct confrontation with people's problems, causes and rights.

Let me ask you, since you know my affection for you: isn't it strange that your great artistic work, "The Anxiety Bank," was produced at a time when your awareness was missing, as you yourself said? When consciousness returned to you, you remained silent and we read nothing from you, until there came your talk with God, or to him, or with yourself. I understood you better than others did. I felt that it was primarily a call, a supplication and a prayer, and nothing more. The people who were distressed by the style ought to have gone deeply into the substance. It was the cry of a great artist who wanted once again to ride the wings of the eagles.

Do not be concerned about my nerves--look after your own, and also your health. You know how dear and precious you are to me, and you know how enjoyable an experience the companionship of a lifetime between us, for many long years, has been as far as I am concerned, and how fertile and green it has been. You have greeted me

and everyone who knows your rights and your eminence in this nation's thought and culture, and you have remained well. The fixed things of affection and love remain between us, as you put it, and the changes in our differences of opinion have remained between us, also in your words, although they will always occur through dialogue, the only means for enlightenment in man's eternal and immortal attempt to seek knowledge and search for the truth, in freedom, with the power of the mind and conscience, and sovereign.

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ARMED FORCES' INVOLVEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Military To Ensure Food Security

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 9 May 83 p 4

[Article by Sayyid 'Ali and Suzy al-Janidi]

[Text] How are the armed forces contributing to development projects?

Director of Food Security Sector says, "1985 will be the year for food in the armed forces."

How have the resources of the armed forces been utilized in development projects? How can the armed forces devise practical solutions to the problems of housing, utilities, telephones and other problems that the public are suffering from so as to provide prompt relief to citizens?

Officials in the food security, signal corps and projects sectors affirm that the efforts of the armed forces in the civilian sector will not affect their military functions and the necessity of developing those functions continuously so as to keep up with the most modern advances in the military. They also affirm that the principal goal of these achievements is not profit but rather delivering these services to the public after the years of war that had a direct effect on reducing performance standards in the state's facilities.

The [moot] question is this: what is the meaning of this new trend?

This is what we will try to shed light on in this investigative report.

The armed forces are the country's and the citizens' armor. We civilians appreciate and esteem every soldier. For the comprehensive development operations that Egypt is carrying out, the state thought it would solicit the expertise of the armed forces to assist it in implementing national development projects. The armed forces no longer signify soldiers and guns; there are many scientific, technical and advanced engineering disciplines in the armed forces. In the state of peace [we now have] the state thought it might utilize the energies of the armed forces that are being wasted for the benefit of the civilian sector and for the sake of a better future. The Corps of Engineers took part in building bridges and paving roads. The Signal Corps is laying telephone cables, and the food security

sector has become involved in projects to supply fresh meat, milk and eggs. The food security sector is also reclaiming land that produces enough to meet the needs of the armed forces. The surplus is sold on the market by the Ministry of Supply.

This serious view reflects a philosophy of the future that Egyptian scientist Dr Faruq al-Baz spoke of. He said that any country's strategy of power for the future will be measured by the extent of that country's ability to be self-sufficient in food. The more food that country exports, the more power it will have. Oil will not last forever; it is the land and what the land will produce that will remain. He who does not have food, will not have the freedom to make decisions.

In view of these goals MAYU toured the armed forces' food security sector and the Signal Corps, using both as two examples of the armed forces' efforts to contribute to national projects so as to reduce the burdens citizens have to bear, to help citizens and to provide food security as well as public security.

Maj Gen Muhammad 'Arif al-Dijwi says the Food Security Sector seeks to utilize the energy that would be lost and to put it to work for the benefit of the civilian sector, "particularly since we are not involved in combat now. The food security sector consists of a set of activities which the armed forces became involved in to produce varieties of food. We are not working to make a profit or to lose money, but we are working with [an eye on] cost factors, and we are utilizing economical units. The returns of our work are allocated to the realization of the plan for which the project was created. Surplus production is sold on the market by the Ministry of Supply. Let me say that the project is still in its early stages. According to the set plan, 1985 will be the year for food security for the products of the armed forces."

Maj Gen al-Dijwi adds, "Quite simply we know that he who owns his bread and butter makes his own decisions, and he who does not, is not free to make his own decisions. Food security plays a role just like that which is played by domestic and foreign security. I would say first that our role is limited now, but if a broader framework is determined for us, we will be ready."

120 Million Eggs a Year

So far, the activities of the armed forces' food security sector are concentrated on the establishment of four egg farms that produce about 60 million eggs a year. The two farms at Anshas-Huckstep are operating at full capacity. The third farm was inaugurated on 16 April. The fourth farm, which is in Huckstep, is under construction and will be inaugurated early next year. We are in the process of concluding a contract to build an egg production complex early in May. This complex will yield about 60 million eggs a year. Thus, the total volume of egg production will be 120 million eggs [a year]. The most important characteristic of this egg production complex is the fact that all the cycles of production will be carried out at the complex. This means that the complex will have a hatchery, a feed plant and its own slaughterhouse.

Regarding the fresh meat project, we are now providing all the fresh meat the armed forces need. We are doing that out of our intense [cattle] breeding projects in Tall al-Kabir. There is a breeding station in al-Fardan and one in Suez.

There is a cattle fattening farm that produces green fodder, and we receive a ration of processed feed from the Ministry of Agriculture. We will build an automated slaughterhouse in al-Tall al-Kabir for processing lower quality meat that would be used in making hamburgers. The advantage of this hamburger meat is that soybeans will be added to it at a rate of 30 percent. Thus, a kilogram of hamburger meat will be much cheaper than a kilogram of fresh meat. Consumer tastes will not be affected. We will thus indirectly increase fresh meat production by 30 percent.

Nine tons of Milk a Day

With regard to the dairy project there are three dairy farms in Shubra Shihab. They produce 6 tons of milk a day. There is another dairy farm in Alexandria that produces 3 tons of milk a day. The third farm is in al-Tall al-Kabir; it produces 1.5 tons of milk a day. [With all this milk] we are meeting the needs of the armed forces for milk.

With regard to poultry fattening farms there are experimental farms in Imbabah that yield 20 tons of poultry in every [breeding] cycle. After the contract for the egg production complex is completed, a study will commence in July for building a fryer fattening complex that will produce 6 million fryers a year. This complex will yield 5,000 tons of poultry meat a year.

In the farm land reclamation sector we began reclaiming 3,000 feddans in al-Tall al-Kabir in the camp of 'Izzat Sharaf. There are 5,000 feddans under consideration [for reclamation] in the area of al-Fayyum. Regarding vegetables and fruits we have so far produced 4,200 field crops and 275 tons of vegetables.

The Efforts of the Signal Corps

MAYU interviewed Staff Maj Gen Ibrahim Fayiz Sabri, chief of the Signal Corps, and we asked him about the role of the Signal Corps in civilian efforts that are being made. He said, "The Signal Corps' involvement in civilian efforts began when the late President Anwar al-Sadat asked that the armed forces join in relieving the suffering of the people [by undertaking] some projects that need our participation. The command [of the armed forces] determined some of the activities that we can contribute to. We began changing telephone cables, and with the Corps of Engineers we began working on road paving and bridge construction projects. In 1979 the Signal Corps signed the first contract with the National Telecommunications Organization to set up a coaxial cable between al-Fayyum exchange and Ramses exchange. After the Signal Corps began implementing such projects, a contract was signed to set up the three telephone systems for the Almazah, al-Qubbah and al-Jizah exchanges. Their capacity is in excess of 100,000 lines. The National Telecommunications Organization commissions the Signal Corps to implement these projects which we carry out in the time set for them; and we do so with high professional standards and with the least cost. We do not think that profit is the goal of these services, but our goal is to take part in relieving people from their troubles. In starting any project we organize conferences during the planning stage to coordinate our efforts and to cooperate with all the authorized departments in all the facilities like electricity, water, drainage and gas. Our purpose in doing so is to find out where the lines and the pipes of these utilities go so we do not ruin them in the digging

process. After a project is completed we turn over to the National Organization the detailed maps showing the locations of the cables, and we guarantee that they are sound. So far we have not had any problems."

Maj Gen Fayiz Sabri adds, "After we finished the three telephone systems project, we executed a contract for four telephone systems: the Shubra system with a capacity for 28,000 lines; the Sidi Jabir system with a capacity for 18,000 lines; the Sidi Bishr system with a capacity for 18,000 lines; and the al-Haram system, which is being completed, with a capacity of 31,000 lines.

The project for six [sic] telephone systems in al-Zamalik, Misr al-Jadidah and Bab al-Luq in Cairo and in Glim and al-Ibrahimiya [in Alexandria] will be completed in December 1984. They will have a capacity of 168,000 lines and more than 70,000 lines for the cables linking the exchanges.

The chief of the Signal Corps adds, "We've finished setting up a microwave axis that will link the oil fields with the parent companies in Cairo, and we've set up numerous microwave sources to link together remote areas in Alexandria, such as al-Hanuvil, al-'Amiriyah, al-'Ajami and al-Nuzhah, because there are no telephone cables there. As a Signal Corps we do not take part in the planning process. This is the function of the National Organization which relies on foreign loans to do that. We are merely a contractor. We are often awarded the bids, and foreign companies charge us with the execution of projects because we are the best agency for executing telephone projects in Egypt."

The chief of the Signal Corps concludes [his remarks] by affirming that the efforts made by the Signal Corps in national projects represent the corps' surplus manpower and equipment. In no way do these efforts affect the signal corps' military functions.

Housing, Bread Shortages To Ease

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 16 May 83 p 5

[Article by Sayyid 'Ali and Suzy al-Janidi]

[Text] What happens when the armed forces contribute to construction?

Four automated bakeries produce 3 million loaves of bread a day.

A plant for prefabricated housing produces a building every 2 months.

It is truly easy to destroy and quite difficult to build. It is wonderful, of course, that the armed forces are taking part in construction projects, and it is splendid that the armed forces can put an end to the housing crisis in 3 years. Officials affirm that the crisis, as far as the men of the armed forces are concerned, will disappear in the next few years, and this will, consequently, ease the crisis in the civilian sector. This is how the armed forces are trying to tackle problems to find suitable housing for every individual in Egypt.

The Engineering Authority that is responsible for projects is saving the state close to 30 percent in prices and close to 20 percent in time. In addition, it is

saving the state free currency which the state has to use to pay for import operations.

These are not hopes; these have become actual facts. Whereas the role of the engineering forces in the crossing operation was to build bridges, their role now is to help the country cross over to where solutions to the country's problems can be found. One of the country's most important problems is housing.

Over a period of 2 years the authority, [relying on] figures implemented projects [whose costs] amounted to 90 million pounds. It saved the state 25 million pounds. What were the most important of these projects, and what is the next plan?

Maj Gen Mahmud Fahim, chief of the Engineering Authority says, "The Engineering Authority with its various departments is involved in several activities. Construction is one of them. Its principal role is to serve the armed forces. Its other role is to serve the civilian sector in accordance with the directives of Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, deputy prime minister and minister of defense. The Engineering Authority would help the civilian sector by providing large segments of the population with relief from their troubles.

"This would be done in two ways.

"First, [it would be done directly] by undertaking to execute integrated projects for the benefit of the civilian sector. Or [it may be done] indirectly by alleviating the burden the civilian sector [has to bear] and meeting all the needs of the armed forces to reduce the demand on the state's [resources] and save them for citizens. In addition, the Engineering Authority can provide trained workers in building and construction or in handling mechanical equipment by training individuals at training centers while they are doing their military service. In addition, the Engineering Authority can polish the skills of those workers in its production units. These workers would then constitute a trained work force for the civilian sector after they leave the military."

Maj Gen Mahmud Fahim adds, "The projects we complete for the benefit of the civilian sector are executed with precision, and expenditures, time and free currency which is required for some projects are saved in the process."

I asked the chief of the Engineering Authority, "How is that?"

He said, "The execution of armed forces projects, such as road paving projects, airports, and the establishment of organizations and military installations, particularly in remote areas, used to be entrusted to civilian public sector companies. The costs and expenditures for these projects were high. The Engineering Authority contributes to food security projects and land reclamation projects for the benefit of the armed forces. It also digs land and canals and establishes farms. The authority is directly involved in [civilian] projects such as the construction of elevated bridges in the governorate of Greater Cairo at the intersection of Isma'il al-Fanjari and Salah Salim Street and at the intersection of al-Khalifah al-Ma'mun and Misr wa al-Sudan Street at the entrance to Shubra.

"The Engineering Authority is also taking part in projects to set up telephone

systems in Cairo and Alexandria. The Engineering Authority also built four automated and semi-automated bakeries that have been turned over to the Ministry of Supply. Each bakery yields three quarters of a million loaves of bread a day in the City of al-Salam [Peace], in the city of 15 May and in al-Haram. The bread that these bakeries produce is equal to the bread that was produced by the bakeries of the Ministry of Supply over a period of 20 years. These bakeries were completed in only 5 months. Two bakeries are under construction: one of them is in Shubra, and the other is in al-'Amiriyah in Alexandria."

Manufacturing Reinforcing Iron Rods

"We also built a plant for manufacturing reinforcing iron rods (reinforcing mesh) that are used in advanced concrete structures. We built this plant for the benefit of public and private sector companies. We thus saved the state the free currency it used to pay to import this reinforcing mesh.

"A water line for the northern coast from al-'Alamayn to north Marsa Matruh has been completed. The line is 200 kilometers long, and it is expected to be completed in 2 years.

The chief of the Engineering Authority adds that the authority built emergency housing units for Cairo Governorate in the area of al-Dawiqah. It built 1,056 units in addition to the housing units it built for armed forces families. At the present time 23,500 housing units are under construction in Cairo, al-Jizah, Alexandria, Tanta, Isma'iliyah and Suez.

"The objective of the armed forces' plan is to solve once and for all the housing problem for officers, for staff officers and for the soldiers and employees of the armed forces. These apartments are assigned to individuals, particularly those who were recently married, according to conditions set by the Ministry of Defense. These individuals pay half of the set payment, which is between 20 and 25 pounds a month, before they move in. After they move in, they pay 50 pounds a month. No other advance payments or key money would be paid for these apartments which after that become the property of the individuals [who live in them].

The Engineering Authority also built the village of al-Tulul in the governorate of North Sinai. Construction of villages in al-Hammah and Wadi al-Masajid in Central Sinai is underway.

40 Apartments in 2 Months

The authority has five plants for prefabricated housing. These plants produce 40 apartments in 2 months. This is a quick way for investing capital quickly; we build an apartment building every 2 months.

Maj Gen Mahmud Fahim adds, "We were able to save the state 3 million pounds in one operation dismantling and tearing down the Shubra al-Khaymah power station. We also saved about 6 months by using a cautious method to blow up the building. The authority's bid was the lowest bid submitted by the international companies which had asked for [payment in] free currencies."

I asked the chief of the Engineering Authority about the delay in earth filling operations in some places after projects are implemented.

He said, "We wait a while for the operations and results of cable tests and project tests so that we do not fill the holes and then have to dig them up again and repave."

I asked the chief of the Engineering Authority, "Why doesn't the authority become involved in an intense way in solving the problems of the civilian sector?"

Maj Gen Mahmud Fahim said, "The Engineering Authority does not replace any sector, but we are using the authority's material resources, its work discipline and its speedy completion of projects to help lighten the burden citizens have to bear. The Engineering Authority is 2 years old, and we were able during that period to implement projects worth about 90 million pounds. We saved the state 25 million pounds on these projects and more than half the set time for the execution of these projects. By saving time we also realized savings in the total material product because [prices for] raw materials are always rising in the market. We were able to save 25 percent of the time and 30 percent of the costs. None of the housing projects take more than 24 months, and we are prepared to turn over part of the apartment buildings before the end of 24 months."

I asked the chief of the Engineering Authority, "Why the savings, and how do we benefit from them in the civilian sector?"

The chief of the Engineering Authority replied, "Despite the good quality finish, the Engineering Authority does everything without bureaucracy and surplus labor. We do not pay wages, but we offer the soldiers incentives. We conduct studies to reduce added costs. We do not have an administration, and we employ the minimum number of people because the public sector is burdened, and the primary objective is to serve the armed forces. The surplus is to be directed to the benefit of civilian sector projects. This provides an opportunity for continuous equipment development and renovation because we realize a return which we use to develop our equipment. At the same time these are construction crews; that is, they perform work similar to the work they do in the armed forces."

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SDAR PRESIDENT MOHAMED ABDELAZIZ ON TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF STRUGGLE

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 20 May 83 No 20 pp 66-67

[Exclusive interview with Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of the POLISARIO Front and president of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR], by Julio Hernandez of PRENSA LATINA on 20 May; place not specified]

[Text] On 20 May, 1973, seven men, of whom only four were armed, attacked the Spanish military post of El Khanga in the northwest of Western Sahara which at the time was a Spanish colony. This action marked the outbreak of the Western Saharan people's long struggle for independence which had been decided on only 10 days previously, on 10 May 1973, with the establishment of the Popular (Front) for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro [POLISARIO].

This minor action, which resulted in the capture of the first arms from the enemy, has with the passing of time become a symbol. From it rose the now powerful Popular Army of Liberation of West Sahara which has forced the withdrawal to a small area of the country of the Moroccan occupation forces-- which attempted to annex the territory for themselves after the withdrawal of the Spaniards.

On the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the struggle for independence, Mohammed Abdelaziz, chief of the state of Western Sahara and secretary general of the POLISARIO, agreed to reply to questions by PRENSA LATINA.

PRENSA LATINA: What has been the significance for the Saharan people of these 10 years of struggle against foreign occupation? What have been the results, after these 10 years, from the military point of view? And what lessons can be learned from the struggle?

Mohamed Abdelaziz: You know that European colonialism began its penetration of Western Sahara about the year 1883. After that date our people struggled against this type of domination with a fierce resistance which lasted until 1936. Those 53 years were typified by the intensity of the armed struggle and by a sort of truce which was only the calm before the storm: the preparation for new battles against colonialism within the framework of uninterrupted resistance. Much of this half century was marked by bloody fighting against the French expeditions which tried to

subject us to their empire, especially in the southern and eastern parts of Western Sahara. Thus, all those years were a fierce struggle against Spanish or French colonialism or against both at the same time, until they came to the conclusion that they had to join forces in order to dominate the area.

Beginning in 1936, the colonialists succeeded in the complete domination of the territory and the crushing of resistance by the Saharan people until the second half of the 1950's when resistance broke out again for a time but was put down as a result of the criminal alliance between Spain and France and the direct complicity of the monarchy set up after the "independence" of Morocco. Our people, always through their national movement, began the search of the right road, for ways and means of winning independence and sovereignty. During the 1960's they made their demands through popular demonstrations and urban guerrilla actions which culminated in the gigantic peaceful demonstrations which our people made on 17 June 1970 and which were crushed with blood and fire by the colonialist forces.

After that, our people and our national movement realized that the independence and sovereignty of our national territory could not be attained by peaceful means. We had no other road to follow except that of revolutionary resistance, of armed struggle. Based on this conviction the POLISARIO began the armed revolution 10 years ago, on 20 May 1973.

Naturally, a decade is a very short period in the life of people and nations but when it is a decade of war, of sacrifice and perseverance, it takes on enormous importance and significance. During those 10 years we have fought the Madrid Tripartite Alliance (Spain, Morocco and Mauritania); we have defeated direct French intervention, in league with Hassan II and former president of Mauritania Moktar Ould Daddah, against our people and now we must fight militarily the largest imperialist power in the world--the United States.

The past decade has also seen the formation of a solid political organization which directs the popular struggle, the POLISARIO Front. It has seen the establishment of a republic which means the realization of our national aspiration. It has seen the definite eradication of several consequences of colonialism such as ignorance and racial and tribal divisions. It has seen the unification of our people on the basis of the principles of the POLISARIO, its program of action and its ultimate objectives. It has seen the demolition of the wall, the destruction of the information blackout which for 100 years was imposed by colonialism on our people's struggle. We have blown it into a thousand pieces and we have made our cause known and have gained international support.

The fundamental lesson learned during these 10 years of struggle is that the Saharan people have inalienable rights and the will to win them.

PRENSA LATINA: The SDAR is a young republic. How has it been able to build the principal state institutions under the difficult conditions of war?

Mohamed Abdelazia: As a consequence of their defeat, the Spanish colonialists ended their administrative presence in our territory, following their military withdrawal in the most disorderly and unjust manner. The people of Western Sahara, resolved not to permit an administrative vacuum and anarchy to prevail in their land and they proclaimed SDAR on 27 February 1976. The situation created by the Madrid Agreement meant that our people, attacked by the Mauritanian-Moroccan troops in the last part of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, were obliged to a large extent to depart and take refuge in the areas liberated and controlled by us or in the lands of friendly nations. But how could we fight under these new conditions and how could we organize our forces to combat the enemy and free our fatherland? How could we organize ourselves and build our own institutions. How could we establish relations with the other nations?

With these objectives in mind, we began by structuring the People's Liberation Army as an organized, trained, capable armed force with combat experience. On the administrative side, we basically have built on the institutions of the POLISARIO as a vanguard organization, on its congresses and on the structures emanating from those congresses. This system proved capable of organizing, guiding and directing the mass struggle. We also succeeded in setting up institutions at the administrative, executive and judicial levels which were suitable for a revolutionary nation engaged in combat. At the executive level, we have based ourselves primarily on the institutions essential for education, public health, justice and the socioeconomic aspects of the citizens' lives.

We can say that in the field of education we have taken important and decisive steps to create social and material conditions for schooling almost all our children as well as a literacy program for many citizens, especially in the army sector.

The secret of our successes is the confidence of our people in their own capabilities, their strong determination, and the correct line chosen to overcome these difficulties.

PRENSA LATINA: What role does the United States continue to play in the conflict?

Mohamed Abdelaziz: The role of the United States in the conflict is one of open intervention. The United States has placed all of its weight in the balance on the side of the aggressor regime. It was not content with the unrestricted sale of materiel, the organizing and training of the Moroccan Army, since the beginning of the war in 1975. The planes by which we were bombarded and from which napalm and phosphorus bombs were dropped and with which an infernal genocidal attack was mounted against our people at Um Drelga, Tifariti and Amgala in 1976 were American aircraft and the bombs were "made in USA." Now the United States has been intervening in direct military action on the side of the aggressor, especially since the second half of 1981 with the beginning of the Ronald Reagan administration.

Therefore, we consider that the United States plays an important part in the war against our people, thus assuming a very dangerous responsibility to the extent that their intervention prolongs the conflict and is directed against a small Third World nation.

The North American superpower is today intervening against this people with all its size and weight. This alone is a grave responsibility although to this we must also add the danger that this means for northwest Africa due to the tension and warlike atmosphere with unforeseeable consequences. The United States do not have the right to meddle in a war like this one under the pretext of preserving their lackeys, nor to intervene in a war against the Saharan people who are fighting for their independence.

I believe that although the United States are acting to preserve their puppet who turned over to them Moroccan territory and the sovereignty and dignity of the Moroccan people and are burying the nation in misery, I believe that this intervention against the Saharan people so as to maintain the king's regime prolongs the war, yes, but it will also be terribly harmful for the profoundly reactionary and anachronistic monarchical system. The prolongation of the war will not help it. American intervention may even be a negative factor against the continuation of the monarchical regime in Morocco.

PRENSA LATINA: What will be the effect of Morocco's attitude toward the efforts by various nations for the opening of direct negotiations with the POLISARIO, aiming at a political solution?

Mohamed Abdelaziz: From the beginning and especially since the SDAR became a full member of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], the majority of the nations of the world and the international and regional organizations as a whole have issued and continue to issue calls to the Moroccans and the SDAR to open direct negotiations for a peaceful solution of the conflict. As for us, we welcome these calls and we continue to accept them, consistent with our responsibilities and acting on the basis of our desire to reach a political solution to this conflict between the SDAR and the Kingdom of Morocco. By its attitude Morocco assumes sole responsibility for the consequences of the prolongation of the war and the dangers of the internationalization of this conflict which is basically a case of decolonization.

Our stand, while welcoming the international calls for opening of negotiations, is to continue our legitimate struggle until the last inch of our national territory has been completely liberated.

PRENSA LATINA: How do the people and the leaders of Western Saharan regard the future while celebrating this anniversary?

Mohamed Abdelaziz: The future will be brilliant for our people in every way. Our people continue their struggle. In the heat of the revolution and at the service of the struggle for freedom they are displaying their

strength in every field, preparing for the future, taking up the battle for the liberation of the last parcel of their territory and establishing relations with the peoples and nations of the world who love peace, justice and rule of law, who will be the masters of the future.

Naturally, these years of war with the Moroccan regime have repercussions inside Morocco itself. These repercussions are very grave. There are economic, political and social crises and there is a consciousness of this within the Moroccan people, in military units, the schools, in the universities, on the street, in the homes, at the factories, in the countryside... throughout the nation.

Objectively speaking, these are factors which provide us support, a natural ally which helps us and contributes to our peoples' struggle. Also there is the will of the Saharan people and army to continue to intensify the struggle to liberate the rest of the national territory and there is also broad international support for our cause.

The SDAR is at present carrying out its proper role within the OAU which is just the beginning for its role in other international bodies.

9204

CSO: 4548/4

LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER VIEWS INCREASING FOREIGN LABOR DANGER

GF051321 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0700 GMT 5 Jul 83

[Text] Ad-Dammam, 5 Jul (WAKH)--Bahraini Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Shaykh Khalifah ibn Salman ibn Muhammad Al Khalifah was warned against the danger arising from the increase in foreign labor in the Arabian Gulf. He said: "We must be extremely careful in employing this kind of foreign labor."

In an interview published in today's issue of the Saudi paper AL-YAWM, Shaykh Khalifah said that Bahrain is making great efforts to replace the foreign labor working on projects with a national labor force. He said that the plan is that by 1990 the proportion of Bahraini workers in several large companies will rise to 90 percent.

The Bahraini minister said: Today we are facing a situation that makes it necessary to view the future and examine what the ratio of foreign labor to national labor will be. He said that the ministerial committee has left each [GCC] country to determine the foreign labor it employs in accordance with its needs and development conditions. However, the committee has agreed to carry out a study to draw up controls that will ensure that the stay of imported foreign labor is temporary.

Referring to temporary foreign labor in development projects, Shaykh Khalifah said that this issue poses no threat, as it is connected with a specific project for a specific period. He was referring to the 2,000 foreign workers working on the Saudi-Bahraini causeway.

The Bahraini labor and social affairs minister denied the accusations leveled at governments in the region, namely that they are not serious in replacing foreign labor with Arab labor. He referred to a problem that obstructs the import of Arab labor, a problem that is connected with the laws of some Arab countries which prohibit or curb the departure of skilled labor.

Shaykh Khalifah ruled out the possibility that the follow-up council of the GCC labor ministers and the GCC secretariat will duplicate each other's work in the field of labor. He said that the ministerial committee has adopted a decision on avoiding duality. He added: "There is no fear of such duality. There are specific issues within the GCC framework, such as the freedom of the citizen of one GCC country to work in another, that are of interest to the GCC and are guaranteed by the GCC unified economic agreement and statutes."

CSO: 4400/414

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

OIL EXPLORATION, SALES--Manama, 2 Jul (WAKH)--In a statement to today's issue of the weekly Bahraini newspaper--AL-ADWA'--Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi, Bahraini minister of development and industry, said exploration for oil in Bahrain will not stop and that there is a team of experts making an assessment in order to reach a decision on whether or not to continue exploration. In reply to a question on BAPCO [Bahrain Petroleum Company] and its recent meeting in Texas instead of Bahrain, he said the company's recent meeting was held in Texas because the company's headquarters moved from New York to Texas and for the purpose of meeting with the team that studied the refinery, which is currently in Texas, to discuss the report which was prepared with it in detail. Present capacity, saying that the world's refining capacity is 40 percent more than its needs and this is why refineries, under the burden of tough competition, reduced their costs. [As published] The rate for refining now is \$2 for one barrel while it costs \$3 in Bahrain. The Bahraini Development and industry ministry said: This high difference must disappear for the factory to remain competitive in the oil market. The Bahraini development and industry minister said BANOCO [Bahrain National Oil Company] will sell oil products worth \$6 million daily during the next months. [Excerpts] [GF021000 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0715 GMT 2 Jul 83]

CSO: 4400/414

NUSAYBAH EXPLAINS EAST JERUSALEM ELECTRIC COMPANY POSITION

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 6 May 83 p 5

[Article: "Anwar Nusaybah Reaffirms East Jerusalem Electric Company's Resolve in Maintaining All of Its Concession"]

[Text] Anwar Nusaybah, the Director General of the East Jerusalem Electric Company commented on the report that Radio Israel broadcast in which it was said that the regional Electric Company came to an agreement with the East Jerusalem Electric Company to grant it permission to extend electric lines to Jewish settlements in the West Bank through regions located in areas licensed to the East Jerusalem Company. He said that the report was untrue and was rumor.

He added that the reality of the situation is that article 17 of the concession authorizes the High Commissioner to permit the regional Electric Company to extend its lines across a region of the East Jerusalem Electric Company on the condition that the lines do not feed any point inside that company's concession. However, they can feed points outside this area, as the East Jerusalem Electric Company is the sole possessor of the right to supply all the points inside the concession area, including Israeli settlements. The company is clinging to this right and has not abandoned it and will not abandon it.

Regarding reading the meters and the collection of fees, this has been done by the Arab company. There are special provisions pertaining to some of the Israeli emplacements that are designated as security-related, whose power is supplied by the Arab company through a meter registering the consumption of all the sites. There are only two settlements that it has been agreed will enjoy the concession of having its meter read in one location. In everything else, meter readings in all areas of the concession will be done in the usual manner without discrimination.

On the matter of increasing power production Nusaybah said that the East Jerusalem Electric Company is about to expand electric power generation and has imported a five-megawatt generator for that purpose from a French company. It also has contracted to import four other generators with a total capacity of 12 megawatts from a British company. The electric company hopes to continue its development program; however, in the meantime, for reasons

everyone knows, it was forced to obtain some of its power from the Israeli Regional Power Company by means of connecting up with that company's lines. It had been hoped that this would be only an emergency operation and discussion on this point was conducted in court wherein the Arab company presented its point of view on its right pursuant to the generation of power that it uses in its concession area.

Within the framework of purchasing power from the regional company, access was gained as part of the provision for buying this power to two points close to the settlements mentioned above. However, the provision does not violate the preceding provisions. Necessity demanded this and it does not mean that the regional electric company has become the owner of the right to supply these two settlements or any other point inside the Arab company's concession area. Connecting these two places may be considered since there is direct supply by the East Jerusalem Electric Company and so that connections may be ready in case the Arab company needs it in times of increased demand as a temporary measure.

Nusaybah finished his remarks by saying that the East Jerusalem Electric Company is determined to hold on to its concession in letter and in spirit in all areas of its license.

9614

CSO: 4404/398

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

GAZA RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE FUNDED--The authorities have agreed to disperse a sum of three million shekels to the Gaza Religious Institute--al-Azharin Gaza--in order to pay the salaries of the teachers and employees and to purchase paper for the months of February, March and April. The authorities had earlier agreed to provide 1.5 million shekels; however, it became evident that that would not suffice to meet the debts owed. Therefore it was decided to double that amount. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 30 April 83 p 2] 9614

WEST BANK LAND SURVEYING--The elders and citizens of Husan in Bethlehem District took legal action against an Israeli company that last week began surveying and charting the al-Masaya section. It should be noted that a year ago the authorities seized about 5,000 dunums in that section. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 4 May 83 p 4] 9614

CSO: 4404/398

KUWAIT

PAPERS COMMENT ON SHULTZ MIDDLE EAST VISIT

LD051208 Kuwait KUNA in English 1034 GMT 5 Jul 83

[Text] Kuwait, 5 Jul (KUNCA)--Daily AL RA'Y AL-'AMM newspaper criticized Tuesday the American Secretary of State George Shultz's saying that his visit to the region is to "feel the pulse."

The paper said (?he) "wanted only to remind those who tied their fate with Washington that the United States is present and moving."

It quoted Shultz as saying that in addition to "feeling the pulse" he seeks to form an idea "to present it to the American President, and that he does not expect to "accomplish anything new." [Quotation marks as received.]

The paper (?gathers that) Shultz's visit to the region is to see "if anything (?has) happened in the peoples mind? And if the Arab pulse [word indistinct] still there or is it ready to surrender and fall in the American trap?"

"But the Arab and international powers, which Washington imagined it is not there, rose up again to shake the American picture" the paper affirmed. The paper came to a conclusion that Shultz came to affirm that the U.S. is still present and "the solution-betrayal game, it played in Lebanon and the region did not come to an end yet."

A daily English-language newspaper commented on the same subject by saying "The U.S. under Reagan has not only lost face in this part of the world but it has lost trust."

KUWAIT TIMES said "Shultz' top priority at this moment ought to be to rehabilitate that trust."

"The Americans have insisted that they alone have the right to set things right in this region," the paper [word indistinct].

It added "So far their record is a dismal failure to demonstrate that they have either the ability or the [word instinct] to be harbingers of peace and justice."

The paper quoted observers of American political behavior as saying "As far as the Reagan administration is concerned, the Middle East trouble spot has been abandoned to its misery."

"Shultz has been (?forced) to the Middle East this time only to bring home some credible material for the President's election manifesto writers, some sob stuff to beguile the voter," KUWAIT TIMES concluded.

CSO: 4400/415

GULF BANKING PRACTICES REVIEWED

GF031332 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 2 Jul 83 p 12

[Text] The characteristics and trends of the banking system and monetary policy in the Gulf countries were extensively reviewed in a special report based on interviews with leading Arab bankers.

The study carried in this month's issue of the ECONOMIC BULLETIN of the central banks and monetary agencies of the Gulf states dealt with a number of cases ranging from interest rate structure to supervision of foreign transfers and the main monetary policy tools.

Other issues focused on the future of banking and monetary cooperation, regulating domestic liquidity and the way of rationalizing bank credits.

The ECONOMIC BULLETIN is jointly published by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Central Bank of Kuwait, Central Bank of Iraq, Central Bank of Oman, Bahrain Monetary Agency, Central Bank of UAE and Qatar's Monetary Agency.

This month's review dealt with the situation in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Stressing the fact that there is no interest rate structure in Saudi Arabia, the study said the policy adopted previously by the UAE Currency Board and presently by the Central Bank, in that respect is established on the basis of noninterference in fixing the maximum or minimum rate.

The commercial banks in the UAE are given the freedom to fix their levels in light of the prevailing market conditions, the report added.

As regards interest on deposits, there is a different situation concerning the deposits in dirham or in foreign currencies. Concerning the latter, the policy applied from the time the monetary authority was established till now depends on noninterference in fixing the rates, as agreement is usually reached between the customers and commercial banks in light of the international rates prevailing on the foreign currency involved. The condition is the same as regards inter-commercial bank deposits.

As for interest rates on dirham deposits, the previous currency board and the present Central Bank continued, until October 23, 1982, to interfere in fixing the maximum payable interest rates according to the volume and maturity of the deposit.

On October 24, 1982, the Central Bank decided to cancel the maximum interest rates on time deposits and left the banks free to fix the interest rates according to conditions in the international and domestic markets.

Regarding exchange rate system and the possibility of coordination among the Gulf countries, the bulletin quoted a spokesman for the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency as saying, the exchange system in the kingdom was dependent on pegging the riyal to the dollar.

But in view of the sharp fluctuations in the value of the dollar during the first half of the seventies, the kingdom decided in 1975 to peg the riyal to the basket of international currencies known as SDR's with a margin of 7.25 percent on the side of the riyal parity rate with SDR.

However, the kingdom now follows a more flexible exchange system because it wishes to keep the riyal protected from unnecessary fluctuations and to realize stability for its value inside and outside the kingdom, the spokesman pointed out.

As regards the possibility for coordination among the Gulf countries in this field, and in view of the importance of this subject and the attention given to it, the secretariat general was required to make a comprehensive study to evaluate the policies and procedures of the exchange rates applied in the member countries.

The monetary agency is presently contacting some international experts for this purpose and the results of the survey will be presented to a technical committee which will submit its recommendations to the committee to governors, he added.

Commenting on the same issue (exchange rate system) the UAE spokesman said:

As known, the state of the Emirates, like other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, follows the system of free exchange rates for foreign currencies. Accordingly, the dirham rate against other currencies is fixed on the basis of supply and demand.

The rise varied according to the change in the rate of exchange of the dollar against the other four major currencies (the mark, the pound, the French franc and the Japanese yen) forming the SDR basket. On December 30, 1982, the Emirates' dirham was 14.9 percent higher than its pegged rate to the SDR. As may be noticed, the limit of fluctuation allowed for the dirham against the basket of currencies doubled.

Commenting on supervision of foreign transfers and procedure followed for identifying capital movement from and to the country both officials affirmed that there is no such control in both the kingdom and the UAE.

CSO: 4400/415

LEBANON

AL-ANWAR ON U.S. ROLE IN CRISIS SETTLEMENT

NC030744 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0530 GMT 3 Jul 83

[From the press review]

[Text] Writing in AL-ANWAR under the title "The U.S. Policeman," Rafiq al-Khuri says: Our problem is not with the United States, although it is the United States which holds the solution in its hands. The U.S. role has changed from the one who is in control of everything in all directions to the one who is being pressured by all sides. The Soviets are exerting pressure in the direction of their participation in the settlement or in the U.S. withdrawal to the extent that they ask Beirut about the American forces, their real role, and how long they will stay. Syria is pressing for the abandonment of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. The Arab states are pressing for a Middle East settlement and for the movement of everybody from Lebanon to the negotiations hall. Israel is pressing for the implementation of the agreement or for partial withdrawal. It does not want to negotiate on the questions of the Golan, West Bank, and Gaza sector.

Amidst all this, the United States appears as an incapable giant. It resists the various pressures, but it cannot exert pressure itself, because the only way to ensure successful U.S. pressure is to move forward. Such a move requires a firm decision which does not exist, although there are some who insinuate that it is in the offing, that the question is one of time, and that President Reagan's administration is determined to notify everybody that it is prepared for the adventure, and that it is prepared to prevent any barrier from stopping the offensive.

CSO: 4400/417

LEBANON

IHDIN RADIO COMMENTS ON SHULTZ' VISIT TO MIDEAST

NC040954 Ihdin Radio of Free and Unified Lebanon in Arabic 0715 GMT 4 Jul 83

[Unattributed "political commentary": "Shultz' New Visit"]

[Text] The U.S. secretary of state is paying a visit to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. The visit comes in complicated circumstances and at a time when all roads seem to be blocked. The agreement which bears the name of Shultz is dead and buried. Israel, which is the main beneficiary, obtained from this agreement the legality of its occupation. The agreement has lifted the international pressures on Israel and has brightened its image in the world. Israel has subsequently put the agreement aside. Israel is now about to implement a partial withdrawal, and we all know the damage it will cause Lebanon.

Syria, which the Shultz agreement tried to damage, has rejected and continues to reject the agreement. The pressures brought upon Syria, be them by the United States directly or through some of its instruments, have yielded opposite results. Today's Syria is stronger than pre-agreement Syria. Once again Syria has shown that it is capable of foiling any agreement that does not obtain its prior approval. Syria has foiled the Camp David accords, it has foiled the Fahd plan, it has foiled the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, it has foiled the Reagan plan, and recently it foiled the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Syria now holds 99 percent of the Palestinian cards. Last but not least, the Soviet Union now gives Syria absolute and unprecedented support.

Under these circumstances, Mr Shultz begins his visit to the area. His ally Israel is experiencing a dilemma in Lebanon. Israel's emergence from this dilemma can only come through a partial withdrawal, which means blowing up the agreement. His other ally, Saudi Arabia, is experiencing a state of weakness in Lebanon and in the area following the collapse of oil and the continued deficit in its budget. The United States' bitter enemy, Syria, is today in its best state. The U.S. elections are getting nearer. Will Shultz' visit resolve all these problems? Or is Shultz' visit a means of propaganda to ward off the accusation that is being leveled against the United States that it is stalling in handling Lebanon's crisis? There are indications that the visit is for propaganda purposes just as is the visit of Philip Habib

and his aides. There are also indications that the visit is to give an injection to the sick and dying agreement, which might help it to live until 22 July--the date of President al-Jumayyil's visit to Washington.

After giving Israel through the United States the ill omened agreement, Lebanon has nothing else to give Israel but to agree on a partial withdrawal in disguise. The United States gets active in the area only to give something to Israel. Meanwhile, Syria insists on refusing to make any concessions. Is Shultz' visit other than one for propaganda purposes?

The situation needs no visits by U.S. officials, but it does need a solid U.S. stance based on justice. This stance requires the aggressor, Israel, to withdraw from Lebanon without any conditions. All Syrian and Palestinian pretexts will then fall, and the doors will be open to save Lebanon. To ask Syria to endorse an agreement that will place the Israeli enemy army in a permanent, legal, and acceptable way at a distance of 20 km from Damascus--such an attempt by the United States is not in the service of Lebanon or Syria but in the service of Israel alone. Even if the United States initiated talks with Syria concerning the Golan, it would thereby [word indistinct], not benefit Lebanon's cause. Why should Lebanon's question be linked with the complicated questions of the Middle East? Why should Lebanon's question be linked with Reagan's plan or other plans?

If the United States really wants to serve and save Lebanon, it has only one course before it, namely to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, the victim, without any conditions. Anything else will be either for propaganda purposes, thus prolonging Lebanon's crisis, or for the purpose of helping Israel at Lebanon's and the Arabs' expense, thus further complicating Lebanon's crisis.

Can Lebanon endure more procrastination or more complications?

CSO: 4400/417

LEBANESE 'GROUPING' SPOKESMAN EXPLAINS VIEWS

PM050941 Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 25 Jun 83 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Lebanese Independent National Grouping says: We Reject Phalangist Control of Power and Work for a Broad Front To Abort the Agreement"]

[Text] Speaking on behalf of the Lebanese Independent National Grouping, Dr Shamir Sabbagh has stated that the Lebanese-Israeli agreement is harmful to Lebanon and its future and is therefore rejected by the grouping, which plans to expand its circles of opposition. He urged the president of the republic to correct the imbalance in the government and its institutions.

He pointed out that the grouping has a political plan of opposition to the agreement, that it complements the work of other organizations opposed to the agreement, and that the grouping intends to expand the framework of its moves to include the largest possible number of people opposed to the agreement with the possibility of establishing coordination between the group, former President Franjiyah, [National Bloc] leader Iddih, and everyone else.

Sabbagh added: The grouping was born in Beirut, and its struggle is carried out there and also proceeds from there. It is in agreement with all the opposition forces in Beirut.

He said he hoped the state would respect freedom. The grouping, he continued, will study the political charter due to be announced by former President Franjiyah and, if it finds common grounds with it, the grouping will join the founding front.

Sabbagh also said that the grouping is in continuous contact with [Progressive Socialist Party leader] Walid Junblatt and [Amal Secretary General] Nabih Birri on the basis of the same national course and objectives. The grouping, he said, is a step toward organizing the masses and boosting opposition to the agreement and the occupation.

On the question of authority balance, Sabbagh said: Lebanon cannot survive except on the basis of two main parallel and equal forces. However, today

there is an imbalance between the Muslim wing and the Christian wing. The government's activities as seen on television do not reflect any sharing of power. The president of the republic has all the power. There is one dominant group. The other group is gradually losing control. It is not too late to restore the balance. The Muslims have not despaired and the grouping has already indicated that it would not be an obstacle in the way of achieving a unified Islamic position.

On the possibility of meeting with the Phalangists, Sabbagh said: The grouping would not oppose such a meeting if the Phalangist Party abandoned its plan for factional and party domination and gave up the notion of victor and vanquished. We will not accept anybody's domination. The president has said that he is above parties. We want to see this implemented in all departments and institutions.

CSO: 4400/417

DEFENSE COMMITTEE ENDORSES GOVERNMENT POLICY

NC041905 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 4 Jul 83

[Excerpts] During a meeting today in which security in Beirut and the possible withdrawals from the mountain were discussed, the parliamentary defense and security committee approved the policy being pursued by the government. The committee meeting was attended by Prime Minister and Interior Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and Defense Minister 'Izam Khuri.

After discussing the security situation, the committee approved legislative decree No 10. The committee gave its approval--after learning the reasons, background, and considerations which dictated the issuance of the decree--provided that the government will take into consideration some of the observations which were made in the meeting.

After the meeting Prime Minister Al-Wazzan said:

[Begin recording] [Al-Wazzan] The discussion dealt with the general situation, particularly legislative decree No 10. The honorable deputies in the committee wanted to know the reasons in our current emergency conditions which prompted the issuance of this emergency decree. After the deputies learned the reasons, background, and considerations which dictated the issuance of this legislative decree, we all agreed on the need to fully implement this decree. However, some deputies raised some questions about the application of this legislative decree and the political quarter which is responsible for implementing it. We gave full clarification. The recommendations which will be made by the committee or the statement which will be made by its chairman on this matter will clarify what I have just said.

[Question by unidentified speaker] Mr Prime Minister, I have a question about [words indistinct] and the security situation in the mountain. Of course [words indistinct].

[Al-Wazzan] The honorable deputies, members of the committee, listened to the government's views in this regard. Their views were agreeable and approved the government's steps and its position which totally rejects the idea of partial withdrawals under any slogan. We are in favor of comprehensive and full withdrawal from all Lebanon, from every inch of Lebanese territory. We do not intend to retreat from this position.

[Question by unidentified speaker] Mr Prime Minister, in what context is U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Lebanon and what information do you have about it?

[Al-Wazzan] The information we have received is that this visit is taking place within the context of direct familiarization with the situation and the political ideas in the area. [end recording]

Deputy Fu'ad Lahhud, chairman of the parliamentary defense and security committee, stated; The committee discussed the topics on its agenda and adopted, by majority vote, the following stands:

1. Decree No 10: It became clear to the committee that the articles in this decree are more severe than legislative decree No 52, dated 1967, on the declaration of a state of emergency. However, it became clear that decree No 10 will not be applied in the manner in which it was supposed to be applied, both with regard to equal treatment in all parts of greater Beirut and to the desired severity. Nevertheless, the defense committee agreed that implementation of this emergency legislative decree should continue, provided that the government takes the deputies' remarks and suggestions into consideration.

2. Filling of the security vacuum by the Lebanese armed forces when the foreign forces withdraw, either completely or partially. The committee emphasized that it supports the government in its clear position vis-a-vis complete withdrawals and its rejection of partial withdrawals except as part of a complete program for total withdrawals. The prime minister explained that in case unilateral partial withdrawals do occur, the legitimate Lebanese forces will be able to fill this vacuum. The deputies drew the government's attention to some preparatory measures which must precede the Lebanese armed forces' filling of the vacuum which would result from the complete or partial withdrawals.

CSO: 4400/417

LEBANON

BRIEFS

SOCIALIST PARTY ON U.S. ROLE, CREDIBILITY--In a statement issued today, the Socialist Democratic Party says that if the U.S. role is confined to that of a bystander it means that Kissinger's plan to fragment Lebanon into sectarian statelets still stands. The party regards a partial withdrawal as a prelude to Israel devouring the south. The party calls on the United States to confirm its credibility by opposing Israel's attempt to evade implementing the agreement. [Text] [NC011748 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 1 Jul 83]

NEW MILITIA EMERGING IN S. LEBANON--A new Shi'ite militia is emerging in southern Lebanon and it will not be part of Major Sa'd Haddad's forces. Our military correspondent has learned this from defense establishment sources. This militia will deal with tasks similar to those of the Christian militia but it is not yet clear who its commanders will be. [Text] [TA060520 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 6 Jul 83]

LEBANESE FORCES SUPPORT GOVERNMENT POSITION--A statement issued by the Lebanese forces this evening supports the Lebanese Government's position, which was stressed at the latest cabinet meeting, that the government will not stand with its hands behind its back during the current conflicts on Lebanese territory that are destroying the Lebanese people, economy, and security. These conflicts are taking place despite the views and interests of the Lebanese people. The statement said that the Lebanese resistance will continue to adhere to its course in liberating all Lebanese territory. It will also continue to concern itself with and participate in the struggle of all honest Lebanese in the North and Al-Biqā' to maintain their Lebanese identity and to not allow either the chronic Syrian ambitions or the current Palestinian domination to become permanent. [Text] [NC042110 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 2015 GMT 4 Jul 83]

PALESTINIANS IN BEIRUT; FATAH IN NORTH--The Voice of Lebanon has learned that Palestinian men come to Beirut from Tripoli at night by fishing boat. The trip takes about 4 hours. In the meantime, the Fatah Command is pooling its resources in Tripoli. It has moved all its men from [words indistinct] in Syria to northern Lebanon. Some 114 men, who have been moved to the Al-Barid and Al-Baddawi camps, have been entrusted with providing protection to Yasir 'Arafat. Fatah in Tripoli is reinforcing the loyal parties and buying offices,

buildings, and arms depots in various quarters there. It is also securing ports to receive military shipments by sea. Other sources told the Voice of Lebanon that men trained by the well known terrorist Carlos have left Tripoli for Beirut with forged Lebanese identity cards. They have been entrusted with carrying out operations against the Israeli forces. It has been learned that some of these men have gone to the southern suburb. In the meantime, some intelligence men have entered certain parts of Beirut with Pakistani passports as workers in workshops and brick factories. [Text] [NC061310 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 6 Jul 83]

DEPARTURE OF MILITARY EXPERTS--Reports from northern Lebanon indicate that a group of military experts left the area 4 days ago for Damascus via the coastal road in a convoy composed of special buses. The group includes about 40 experts from Bulgaria, North Korea, Cuba, and East Germany, who were working as military advisers in the Al-Baddawi and Al-Barid camps. This step, as explained by Lebanese sources, was at the request of the governments of these experts lest their presence in the north be interpreted as support for one party or the other in the current conflict between Yasir 'Arafat and Abu Musa [Sa'id Musa Muragha] groups. Meanwhile, the Syrian forces have reinforced their positions in several areas in the north, particularly in Tripoli and areas close to the Al-Baddawi and Al-Barid camps, where vehicles and artillery were recorded to have arrived. [Text] [NC021912 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1715 GMT 2 Jul 83]

DEPUTY AL-HUSAYNI ANSWERS JUNBLATT, BIRRI--After meeting with Deputy Chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Deputy Husayn al-Husayni made a statement in which he expressed surprise at the statement issued in Damascus by Nabih Birri and Walid Junblatt expressing their opposition to having the Lebanese Army deploy in the mountain. Al-Husayni, however, agreed with Birri and Junblatt in their opposition to partial withdrawal as well as in the coordination, but he said: Opposition to the Lebanese Army's deployment in the mountain contradicts the general basic principle to which we have been adhering from the onset of the Lebanese tragedy--the principle of striving to have the army deploy in all the homeland's territory. Al-Husayni said: Since we reject the continued stay of any illegal force on Lebanese territory, this is all the more reason for the Lebanese Army to replace all the illegal forces. [Text] [NC060546 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 5 Jul 83]

U.S. ROLE IN AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION--The parliamentary quarters are not convinced that the United States is throwing its weight behind implementation of the agreement. In a statement that he made today, Deputy George Sa'adah said: It is inadmissible for a great state like the United States, while its credibility hangs in the balance, to permit any side to hinder an agreement that was hammered out with its participation. Deputy Yusuf Hammud said: We request President Reagan to do as Eisenhower did in 1956 and tell all the foreigners; Hands off Lebanon. Deputy Melkon Ebligatyan said: If the obstacles in the way of implementation of the agreement persists, all we will then have to do is to abrogate it. The reason is that partial withdrawal means partitioning. [Text] [NC021817 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 2 Jul 83]

CSO: 4400/417

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

ACTIVITIES OF PALESTINIAN LABOR MOVEMENT SURVEYED, EXTOLLED

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 1 May 83 pp 34-37

[Article by Nasir Farajallah: "File: A Conversation on the Palestine Federation of Workers and Workers' Issues"]

[Excerpts] On 1 May, the international day of the working class, the day of its unity and its struggles, AL-HURRIYAH is publishing two files in this issue. The first is an extensive conversation with a number of leaders of the Palestine General Federation of Workers, the members of the federation's secretariat general:

Our brother Khalid 'Abd-al-Ghani, assistant secretary general for information affairs.

Our brother Ibrahim Bal'us, assistant secretary general for international relations.

Our brother Muhammad Abu Layl, assistant secretary general for Arab relations.

The discussion deals with the federation's history and current conditions and its positions regarding conditions of the working class in the occupied territory and Lebanon.

The Labor Federations' Old Roots

[Question] What is the state of the Palestine Federation of Workers at present, its relationship with the Palestinian working class, and its role in training it and urging it to play its part in the ranks of the revolution?

Our Brother Khalid 'Abd-al-Ghani replied:

"At the outset, we must cast a brief historical glance at the formation and conferences of the federation, so that we can realize and describe its current role in the Palestinian revolution and the national cause.

"The Palestine General Federation of Workers" was established in 1963 in Gaza. The formation of this federation was an extension of the Palestinian trade union movement established in the early twenties, specifically the one which assumed a legitimate existence in Haifa on 21 March 1925 in the name of the Palestine Arab workers'.

"Under the Zionist invasion, which destroyed the social structure and union movement of the Palestinian people on the land occupied in 1948, the presence of an independent Palestinian union movement within Palestinian territory was eliminated in 1948 with the dispossession of the Palestinian people from their homes. The union members in remaining Palestinian territories tried to preserve their union activity, especially in the areas of Nabulus, Janin, Hebron, Tul-karam, and Jericho, but, because of the annexation of the remaining part of Palestine to the East Bank of the Jordan under the dominance of the Hashemite regime, and in view of the backward nature of the Jordanian laws at that time, which did not permit union organizations, activity by branches of the Palestinian Arab Workers' Society was prohibited, and its headquarters were sealed off by red wax by security forces. The pioneer of the union movement at that time was the late Husni al-Khafash, secretary of the Palestinian Arab Workers' Society branch in Nabulus.

In the other part of Palestine, the Gaza Strip, which fell under Egyptian administration, the old and new Palestinian unionists, with the support of the International Federation of Arab Unions and the Workers' Federation of Egypt, in view of objective circumstances there and the preservation by the strip of the Palestinian identity, managed to form the Palestine General Federation of Workers in 1963, and the federation managed to hold its first conference on Palestinian territory in Gaza in 1965. The membership in the first conference was numerically limited, but the circumstances of the federation developed continuously with the holding of each new conference."

The Course of the General Federation

Our brother Ibrahim Bal'us, "Abu Nidal," talked about the history of the new federation, and said:

"The first conference was an important trade union initiative, especially since the re-establishment of the Palestinian union movement came about as the attainment of two goals:

"One, the establishment of the Palestinian national personality in the international context, and the assumption of the reins of initiative in the struggle in this context.

"Two, since the Palestinian labor movement is a deep-rooted movement with a history, it was necessary to reorganize its ranks through its union organizations, the Palestine General Federation of Workers.

"Therefore, the convening of the first conference of the federation should be considered the first point of departure for the Palestinian working class' political and social struggle after 1948, especially since participation in this conference was marked by various areas where the Palestinian working class was present, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, Gaza, West Germany (as observers) and Iraq. The holding of the conference also gave impetus to the working class which had not participated in the organization of the ranks and the formation of branches of the Palestine General Federation of Workers.

"After that came the convening of the second conference in 1967, before the aggression, in Cairo. Participating in that in addition to the branches mentioned above was the Syrian branch.

"That was followed by the third conference in Cairo in 1969, which underlined the Palestinians' armed struggle to regain their rights in full. The fourth conference was held in Damascus in 1971, and an expansion was observed in the organizational scope of the federation, since new branches took part, such as those of Denmark, Sweden and Libya. In addition, many Arab and international labor federations attended and took part in the activities of this conference. It stressed the importance of the role of the Palestinian working class in the political and social struggle and the importance of the international solidarity which the Palestinian cause had started to enjoy.

"The fifth conference was held in Damascus in 1974. This conference witnessed a development in the bylaws and the constitution and an increase in union organizational scope, since, in addition to the branches mentioned above, the branches of Australia and Belgium took part.

"The sixth conference was held in Damascus in 1978. This conference was a manifestation of international solidarity with the workers and the people of Palestine. The number of friendly union delegations which were invited and attended the conference came to 95.

"At this conference, a new branch joined the federation, the branch of the United Arab Emirates, and the ranks of the federation expanded qualitatively and quantitatively. At the present time, we are preparing to hold the seventh conference, which is to be held at the end of this year."

[Question] When and where will this conference be held?

[Answer] So far, the place and time have not been specified. It is expected that other new branches will attend, such as those of The Netherlands and Norway, since two Palestine General Federation of Workers branches are being formed in these two countries.

The Federation Includes One Tenth of the Palestinian Workers

[Question] What is the size of the working class in the federation, relative to the Palestinian working class in the various areas where it is to be found?

Our brother Khalid 'Abd-al-Ghani:

"The number of people in the federation, on a union basis, relative to the Palestinian working class as a whole, domestically and abroad, ranges from 10 to 15 percent. The percentage varies from branch to branch. The reason for that is the difficult conditions Palestinian workers are experiencing in various areas, since the governments concerned in some areas in which our people are present do not permit union organization."

Difficulties in Saudi Arabia and Jordan

[Question] Has the federation managed to establish groupings for all Palestinian workers?

[Answer] As a matter of fact, we have not been able to establish groupings for all Palestinian workers outside the occupied nation, but in basic form we have been able to establish ones for most of them, except for the big communities of Palestinian workers in Saudi Arabia and Jordan!

In reality, we consider that it is necessary to support Palestinian union activity, in its capacity as the face through which the Palestinian revolution looks out at the international union and labor world. In this regard, we have received increasing attention from Palestinian organizations, especially in the Lebanese context, and we hope that other environments will be affected by the Palestinian revolution, in Palestinian communities in the land of the diaspora, by the platform that prevailed in the labor union arena in Lebanon, so that the attention of Palestinian organizations to federation branches and the performance of media and union activity will grow and prompt members to participate in the activities of the branches of the Palestine General Federation of Workers and increase the number of members belonging to it. This will have a positive effect on the development of the internal and organizational structure of the federation and will be reflected on its union, political and social activity in the future.

The federation's status within the ranks of the PLO has been constantly developing, historically, since its establishment. In previous Palestine National Congress sessions, our federation was represented by 12 members; the size of its representation increased from 12 to 16 members in its last session, held in Algiers. This to some extent reflects the growing magnitude of the Palestinian working class and its activity in the Arab and international contexts. Our federation is also represented in the Palestinian Central Council, where it is represented by our brother the secretary general, Fathi al-Raghib, and the federation participates in the other Palestinian organizations concerned. For example, it participates in membership of the Palestinian Committee for Asian and African Peace and Solidarity, and we also participate in other committees, such as those concerned with people's organizations and Palestinian activities in general.

[Question] How are relations between the branches and the secretariat general?

What is the nature of the relationship, especially since we hear and see that some branches sometimes are incapable of dealing with the problems they face?

[Answer] First, there is a general constitution which governs the process of Palestinian union organization activity and organizes the course of work and relations between the branches and union organizational frameworks and the organizational structures.

The branches are almost wholly independent internally under the constitution, the constitution of the Palestine General Federation of Workers, and they have their own bylaws, which govern them and control their activities. If a violation of the federation constitution and bylaws occurs, the secretariat general or the executive committee of the federation then intervenes.

The branches have rights and obligations. Each branch is represented in the general conference on the basis of the size of its membership, and is also represented in the higher council of the federation, which meets every 8 months,

in accordance with the size of its membership. Each branch is represented in the executive committee of the federation by a single delegate, except for the Gaza branch, which is represented by three members, in view of the special nature of the situation in Gaza, because the first federation was formed there and existed until the occupation, and, because of the conditions that arose after that, most of its leaders were compelled to leave, and a decision was taken in one of the federation boards that the federation leaders should remain the legitimate representative of the branch, as long as the occupation remained in effect.

All branches share in drawing up the general policy of the federation and draw up policy on internal, Arab and international relations.

Relations with Unions on the West Bank and Gaza

[Question] What is the federation's relationship with workers in the occupied territories and the unions that exist there?

[Answer] Since the occupation in 1967, the unions on the West Bank have started to regain their Palestinian character, having been a part of the Jordan General Federation of Unions in the period preceding the occupation, and, whereas these unions had been limited in number, they started gradually to develop. From the seven or eight unions that existed on the bank, the unions that now exist come to more than 50.

There are influential organizations on the union scene in the West Bank. Unfortunately, with the increasing union activity on the bank, a rift occurred within the unions that resulted in the emergence of a schism. To repair the rift and restore solidarity to the federation of unions, we, in the federation, have taken the initiative of dealing with it in order to avoid the maximum moral losses that could have a negative effect on union activity, and we have made contacts with all unions without exception to preserve the unity of Palestinian union activity.

We have lent a helping hand in various ways in order to eliminate the breaches that arise generally when this sort of rift occurs!

Historically, this sort of rift has occurred in the history of the Palestinian union movement. In addition to the Palestinian Arab Workers' Society, the Arab Federation of Workers was formed; its headquarters were in Yafa. This rift continued until the occupation occurred, with its structural, social and political destruction of the Palestinian people, in 1948.

[Question] What about the unions in Gaza and their problems?

Our brother Muhammad Abu Layl:

"We in the federation do not deal with a person called 'Abd-al-Rahman Darabiyah. The federation condemned him in the past, in 1967, when the occupation started on the West Bank; in addition, the Palestine General Federation of Workers branch in Gaza dismissed him and branded him an agent of the occupation in 1974, and requested that the relationship with him end and that there be no contact with him.

"In 1980, the headquarter of the Palestinian Federation of Workers' Unions in the Gaza Strip was reopened by decree of the occupation authorities as a result of pressure from international union public opinion and various condemnations on the part of the International Labor Organization and international labor organizations.

"The federation consists of six unions: carpentry and construction, general services and commercial activities, drivers, sewing and textile workers, agricultural workers, and workers in metal industries.

"The federation branch in Gaza is considered one of the charter branches of the Palestine General Federation of Workers, and Khalid 'Abd-al-Ghani talked about that at the beginning of his talk.

"The federation devotes special attention to workers in the occupied territories, including workers in the Gaza Strip, since it offers material support to national unions in the context of the growing struggle between it and unions which are supported by the Jordanian regime and the Israeli authorities. We hope that the aid offered in the context of the 'funds to support steadfastness' will go to support all unions, and not one union to the exclusion of another.

"Our workers domestically are splendidly aware of the current situation. It is true that there are rifts, but the federation is exerting all its efforts to resolve these disputes."

Exceptional Effort Is Needed To Help the Workers in Lebanon

[Question] The Lebanon unions were mentioned. There is no doubt that the Lebanon branch is an important one and has achieved rich experience in the context of union organization. What is the difference between the experience and structure in Lebanon and other experiences and structures? How do you evaluate the activity of this branch, before and after the occupation?

Our brother Khalid 'Abd-al-Ghani:

"The union experience in Lebanon, or in the Lebanon branch, began as in the other branches, but, since the Palestinian revolution was present in major form on the Lebanese stage, the Lebanon branch was given an opportunity to organize its ranks on union bases that were more advanced than in other branches.

"In the context of the freedom which Palestinian rifles have won, and in the context of the protection the Palestinian revolution has afforded, the Palestinian workers in Lebanon have been able to embark on a struggle for demands and a union and political struggle on all levels, and they have made important accomplishments. For one thing, they have managed to shift the organizational structure of the branch, which was based on the establishment of workers' committees and leagues and so forth, to the formation of occupational unions, especially in the last 2 years. This organization was officially announced at the seventh conference of the branch, which was held in the early part of 1982.

"The branch was able to build social organizations embodied in consumer cooperative societies which became widespread throughout the Palestinian camps, where

our people are situated. None of this was at all separate from the full support and backing on the part of the secretariat general of the federation and the other branches, as well as support from the PLO in providing other sources of support from Arab and international bodies and organizations.

"The creation of unions outside the occupied homeland is not in general possible, in view of the fragmentation of the Palestinian people and the difficulty of creating Palestinian labor groupings which are united in character in the industries and organizations in which they work in the Arab countries and elsewhere, except for the Palestinians in occupied Palestine and to some extent in countries like Lebanon and Jordan. However, in view of the special circumstances in Jordan, the union has not resorted to organizing the Palestinian workers there, in view of the political and social dangers that such a tendency has lead to, leading to the creation of a rift between the Palestinian and Jordanian people.

"As regards the status of the Palestinian working class in Lebanon following the occupation, the fact of the matter is that the occupation has produced new circumstances, especially following the destruction that afflicted the economic structure and the infrastructure of the Palestinian revolution, particularly in southern Lebanon. As a result of the savage, barbarous destruction the Israeli occupation army in the south carried out, the terror which it engaged in against the members of our people, the destruction of camps and economic organizations, the imprisonment of thousands of members of our people, the killing of many, the liquidation of many, and the dispossession of many, a new situation has arisen where, for example, the camp of 'Ayn al-Hilwah, which was inhabited by more than 130,000 citizens in the past, houses just 15,000, as hostages, which shows that the majority of people who are able to work have been compelled to leave. This in itself has created an economic problem for the population. In addition, the continued imprisonment of hundreds, indeed thousands, of Palestinians has also led to a drain of manpower, and that has had an effect on the process of building up the camps themselves.

"We in the Palestine General Federation of Workers consider that it is our duty to extend a helping hand to our brothers in the camps through their organizations, especially the federation branches and leagues, through its cooperative societies, and through the organizations of the PLO, which the recent Palestinian Congress recommended intensify its aid so that the federation could recover from its economic adversity. Certainly, this adversity can be resolved in a reasonable manner only with the departure of the Israeli occupation forces and permission for the inhabitants to engage in their activities within the Palestinian and Lebanese institutions.

The Lebanese Authorities' Laws Are Unfair

"We also believe that the new laws that the Lebanese authorities have issued greatly limit Palestinians' ability to obtain work. This in itself has raised a problem, and the PLO has assumed the task of facing up to it and holding discussions with the Lebanese authorities in order to solve them. This requires that the Palestinian media and Arab and friendly union organizations offer their support for Palestinian workers in Lebanon, in areas which the Lebanese authorities control and in areas lying under Israeli occupation, so that it will

be feasible for Palestinian workers to do their jobs in an atmosphere of equality with Lebanese workers, carrying out what the Arab League approved a long time ago to the effect that Palestinian subjects in Arab countries should be treated in a manner similar to that of the subjects of each country.

"As a result of the occupation, the arrest of many Palestinian union members, the prohibition of union activity in areas lying under the control of the Israeli occupation army, the vexations our workers and union members face in many areas where responsibility is reverting to the official Lebanese authorities, their deprivation of their most elementary rights, their exposure to injustice and oppression, their expulsion from work, and the fact that they are compelled to leave as a result of all that, the organizational structure of the federation has been disrupted in the areas lying under the dominance of the Israeli occupation, and the union conditions of our federation's branches in the areas which the Lebanese authorities are supervising have become relatively frozen.

"In spite of that, our federation and various bodies are still offering aid to the consumer cooperative societies belonging to the federation so that they may continue to exist and persevere in their mission.

"In the al-Biqa' and the north, the federation has intensified its activities, expanded its activities, and directed its resources with the aim of fundamentally implanting bonds and strengthening their ability to persevere."

An Arabwide Conciliatory Role

Question At what level do Arab and international relations with the Palestine General Federation of Workers stand?

Our brother Muhammad Abu Layl:

"In general, the level of relations between the Palestine General Federation of Workers and Arab labor union federations is good, but, unfortunately, these relations are always subject to political circumstances, in particular as regards the level of relations between the PLO and the Arab regimes, which in most cases are reflected in union relations with our federation. This can be attributed to the fact that most Arab union federations are proceeding in accordance with their regimes' viewpoints.

"Therefore we can say that the federation's relations arise from the general policy of the Palestinian revolution, and its relations with the labor union federations arise in the light of this.

"The federation often plays a pioneering role in strengthening the unity of the Arab working class; one should bear in mind that there are disputes in the Arab union arena which result from differences in the political views of the Arab regimes to which most of these unions belong.

"This dispute will plainly appear when the meeting of the Central Council of the Arab Workers' Federation is held in Morocco next July, and in the conference which is to be held in Algiers in October of this year. Our federation hopes to play its part on behalf of the unity of the Arab working class organizations, in order to transcend the disputes within them."

On the international level, our brother Khalid 'Abd-al-Ghani replied,

"In the international context, our federation maintains firm relations with federations in the Socialist bloc countries and the Soviet Union, in particular the International Federation of Unions. We also have good relations with the Organization of African Unity Union and progressive union organizations in Western Europe, especially as far as the unions of France, Italy, the Federation of Unions of Cyprus, and the General Federation of Portuguese Workers go.

"In addition, in the recent period, following the maturation of the conditions of the Palestinian cause before and after the recent war in Lebanon, relations of worker solidarity have developed, now that the justice of the national cause has appeared all over the world."

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DAILY URGES ARAB MOVES AGAINST U.S.

LD081546 Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 29 Jun 83 p 1

[Editorial: "Why Don't Arabs Counter U.S. Hostility With Practical Moves?"]

[Text] Ever since the signing of the submission agreement under which Lebanon is to be severed from its Arab nation, which is what happened to Egypt under Camp David, the U.S. Administration has been trying to peddle the agreement in various ways.

After the completion of the recent so-called reassessment of U.S. policy in the region, the Reagan administration leaked some "observations" which observers regard as the broadlines of the strategy of the new U.S. moves. One of these "observations" was reportedly made by a number of U.S. officials to the effect that, if a settlement is to be quickly achieved in the region, the Reagan administration must come up with new offers regarding the occupied Arab territories.

The same U.S. officials have also been quoted as saying that, for Washington to play a more effective role, the parties to the conflict, especially Syria, should be more flexible regarding the Shultz agreement and should withdraw their forces from Lebanon.

Without doubt, numerous Arab regimes and "Arab" and foreign media have volunteered the answer on Syria's behalf. The Egyptian prime minister said last week that, if Washington were to drop an official hint to Syria about negotiations over the Golan Heights, Syria would drop its opposition to the Shultz agreement. It has also been reported that the Reagan administration has asked its Arab friends to try to persuade Syria to change its attitude.

To sum it all up, there is a concerted campaign against Syria and its nationalist attitude not only to the Lebanese question but also to all issues of principle. It is worth noting that this campaign escalated when the new U.S. moves began.

We want to emphasize that Syria's attitude to the hostile U.S. policy in the region is not something casual, as some try to portray it. It is a firm and principled attitude which will not change unless the U.S. Administration changes its hostile policy toward the Arabs and unless it draws away from the Zionist falsehood, which is obviously quite impossible.

Hence, any talks about a possible change in the Syrian position on the contract of submission and other national issues is simply a part of the campaign of doubt launched to undermine Syria's credibility and patriotism. When it rejected the Camp David agreements and severed all its relations with the Egyptian regime, Syria stressed that its position will remain the same until the camp agreements and consequences fall. Syria's present attitude to the submission contract has not been and will never be less firm than that--quite the contrary, in fact, because the submission contract is a serious threat to Syria and to the safety and security of the Arab nation.

At any rate, out of a desire to stop further deterioration in the Arab situation as a result of the desperate U.S. attempts, Syria again calls on the Arab nation to reconsider its declared and undeclared policies toward the enemies of our national causes, especially the United States, which is flagrantly hostile to us. If the Arabs make up their minds and adopt the right nationalist stand, they will undoubtedly be able to do much and to change many things in the interest of our Arab nation and its future objectives.

The question, in brief, is this: Why don't the Arabs meet U.S. hostility with practical moves to change the present formulas and open doors for serving the usurped Arab rights and the mortgaged Arab future? That is the pressing question, which requires an answer now, before it is too late.

CSO: 4400/416

DAILY ON DESIGNS TO PARTITION LEBANON

JN291434 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0315 GMT 29 Jun 83

[The press review]

[Text] Under the headline, "Lebanon and the Coming Danger," TISHRIAN comments on the enemy's plan to withdraw its forces to southern Lebanon on the pretext of the redeployment of forces. TISHRIAN says: All indications show that the United States is about to give its approval of the Zionist plan to withdraw its forces from the area north of the Al-Awwali River and redeploy them in southern Lebanon. In other words, they want to implement their plan under the cover of the so-called redeployment of forces which aims to partition Lebanon.

U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis returned to Tel Aviv 2 weeks ago from Washington with the approval in principal of the plan. Meanwhile, the two Zionists, Yehuda BenMe'ir and David Kimche have held intensive talks in Washington on the details of the implementation. This means that the plan is no longer just an idea. Despite this, the responsibility of its implementation is not confined to the United States and Israel as much as it is confined to the Lebanese Government, which was fully aware that the agreement, which it signed, is rejected by Syria, and that accepting it, or more precisely, accepting its contents, will allow Israel to carry out its withdrawal to the south and to begin the partitioning in the north.

TISHRIAN adds: It is a fact that the Lebanese leaders are talking about the benefits gained from their rejection of partial withdrawal, but this talk stems from a definite and incremental objective--keeping the Zionists in Ash-Shuf and the mountain areas until the fighting there is settled in favor of the factional government, on the pretext that this fighting is one of the most dangerous manifestations of partitioning in Lebanon.

Any observer of events in Lebanon must not forget that the U.S. centered talk, during and after the Israeli invasion, centered on Lebanon's unity, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legitimacy on its territories. Now, U.S. concepts have changed, others have emerged, and hints about Lebanon's future have come to the surface. The U.S. leaders began talking in a way that will exonerate them in advance from the responsibility of imposing partition on this small country as if what has taken place was not planned or even known by them. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz says that Lebanon is facing one of

two choices; either the implementation of the agreement, or partition, as if one were contradictory to the other. But, with little mediation and analysis, it appears that the agreement has been formulated in a way that Syria will reject it, because it is contrary to or even completely contradicts its interests, the Arab nation interests, the future of the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that it was also formulated in a way that the Lebanese Government should agree to it freely or by force. The agreement will then appear as if it designed for the sake of the next step, that is partition.

TISHRIN says: The Lebanese regime is responsible for the implementation of the partition plan. It is no secret that supporting a Lebanese party against another is one of the manifestations of entrenching sectarian and political factionalism in the Lebanese society. This is in harmony with the plurality of ideology to which the Phalangist Party is devoting its attention. Are tens of witnesses and much evidence of what this party's leaders are saying about choosing Balkanization as the best solution to the disputes existing in the Middle East?

TISHRIN concludes: It is very important that all Lebanon's sons assume a responsible role in confronting the danger, represented by the U.S.-Israeli-Phalangist plot. The objective now is Lebanon. Tomorrow it will be, the sons of Lebanon, and then a gloomy destiny will be waiting for the sons of our entire Arab region. What is required now is that we pause and think of the future, taking recent events into consideration. This should result in strengthening the Lebanese national resistance, otherwise good bye to Lebanon, its future, and its destiny.

CSO: 4400/416

SYRIA

BRIEFS

RFL ON ARREST OF SUNNI OFFICERS--Radio Free Lebanon learned today that Syrian Sunni officers of various ranks, who are sympathetic to the Yasir 'Arafat group, have rejected the Syrian command's orders to shell the Fatah loyalists in the Al-Biqa'. These officers are in command of the Syrian positions from Barr Ilyas to Al-Masna'. Syrian intelligence men have arrested these officers and beat and tortured them at the Al-Masna' prison before taking them to Syria for trial. Observers recall that what is happening these days to the Sunni Syrian officers resembles what happened to the Christian officers in the past when some of them rejected Syrian orders to shell peaceful Christian areas. Security sources explain that there is confusion in the Syrian Army as a result of differences of opinion and because 'Alawite officers are giving orders to Sunni officers. [Text] [NC281217 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic 1145 GMT 28 Jun 83]

CSO: 4400/416

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

MINISTER DISCUSSES INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS IN LIGHT OF NEW LAW

Aden AL-MASAR in Arabic 1 May 83 pp 7-9

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Qadir Ba Jamal by Muhammad 'Abdallah Mukhshif; date and place not given]

[Text] In an AL-MASAR interview with Mr 'Abd al-Qadir Ba Jamal, nominated member of the central committee, minister of industry, president of the petroleum and minerals authority, the first part of which was published in the previous issue, he especially talked about the concerns and anxieties about petroleum and attempts that have been devoted to it and its discovery.

In the second and final part of this interview our talks with the minister revolved around the history of industry, its beginnings and aims, the participation of the private sector and expatriate national capital in industrial projects.

[Question] How has national and expatriate capital had a share and role in building industry and in the fields where it had been applied or particularly will be applied? And have there been any great incentives or facilitation for this investment resulting from the investments act recently enacted?

[Answer] The new investments act comprehends most of the industrial sector. It is restricted in its basic goals to supporting the state's plans and to bringing about the private sector's participation in addition to giving an opportunity to the foreign, Arab, and Yemeni sectors and to promote the small-scale private sector to share in the industrial development process as well as other developmental programs in different sectors. I feel gratified by some of the preliminary results that have started to be noteworthy, but which have not been brought about by the new investment act but under the regime of the old investment law. There had been another law named the legislation and industrial investment act, but only now has it been given its most general and comprehensive significance. The issue was not the privileges, exemptions, and other things which the new law has given to investment, but the issue is only related to the national attitude toward the national capital itself. Namely, how could this capital share in investments? For that we legally arranged for participation.

Now we are faced by a body of demands to set up industrial projects which are being studied in the ministry of industry. We have already brought a large portion of the projects where circumstances are right to establish them to the attention of the higher committee for investment promotion, under the chairmanship of the minister of planning. Also it is possible that the council of ministers may agree on a new agenda of projects which will be implemented through the means of the state and private sectors jointly in addition to the projects that will be carried out entirely and directly by the private sector.

As for expatriate capital we have already found that some of the emigrants are very enthusiastic. However, the truth is we must say frankly that most of them work in the field of commerce and they are looking in the regions they have emigrated to for easy and quick profits, that much is obvious. For this reason when they think of the opportunity of an industrial project they are somewhat apprehensive about the project's future, because of their inexperience with it; for instance, will it turn a profit on its surpluses and revenues, etc.? In my estimation some who have actually been venturesome have embarked on an exceptional experience since the state is offering extraordinary means to facilitate investment. An example of this is that some of the projects began with very scanty sums, you can't imagine, and now these are corporate firms in the joint sector. These projects started with 100,000 dinars and now their capital stock has grown to 2 million dinars. One of these joint sector companies is a sponge factory where 40 individuals of the private sector share 49 percent of the capital stock while the state owns the remaining 51 percent. Most of these owners are small share-holders. This company is now embarked on building a new project to modernize and upgrade the plant, at a cost of at least one and a half million dollars. That means that the state has taken part by means of extending credit loans to the joint sector, so that it can develop. A similar situation pertains to the cigarette company. At the same time there is a new project for the rubber thong sandals factory that was reviewed recently and which includes a renovation and a modernization of old pieces of machinery that will increase by 50 percent the sale value of these sandals abroad, something that will practically give these machines new life. Likewise, there are projects that have gotten preliminary agreement, comprising powdered soap and soap cakes manufacture, plastics manufacture, and ready-made clothing manufacture in addition to a number of proposed manufacturing projects now under study. No sooner does the study show a project's economic value than we begin to do it."

The minister of industry broke off his easy manner to prepare and talk about the obstacles and mistakes that have been encountered on the way and have afflicted the progress of industry. After he took a long draft on his cigarette, I turned the recorder on to catch what he wanted to say.

[Answer] We are in truth suffering from a lack of studies, the studies are insufficient. In order to repair this deficiency we have worked this year on a new industrial land survey by agreement with the Arab Organization for Industrial Development. This survey will afford us an opportunity to present well-planned projects. As a result of the state's policy these projects will be further promoted.

After this explanation or rectification the minister turned his words to talk on the affairs and concerns of manufacturing and the role and share the emigrants can take in it.

[Answer] In the past few days we have received requests from a group of emigrants to develop three projects. They are a plant for toilet paper and kleenex manufacture and the like, a plant for the manufacture of medical cotton, gauze, and baby diapers, and the third project is connected with the establishment of some workshops to produce some kinds of tools and various other operations. Regarding the individual in the private sector we want to encourage him with the possibilities of some investors. We have already given consent to the building of a ball-point pen factory, the machinery for which will arrive shortly, and for another factory to produce aluminum doors and window frames, and all kinds of aluminum products for building needs. This factory will be set up in Aden while another will be built in al-Mukalla, in addition to a second factory in Aden in the public sector to promote lively competition and so as to prevent a monopoly in the market. We have also given permits to the private sector in some provinces to set up some production units, such as for tiles, metal work, etc., so that this sector can share in solving its shortage of construction materials. In addition, we have given permits for setting up light manufacture like macaroni and spaghetti manufacture. At the same time we are trying to help those with ideas for projects to direct them toward field in which they can work. The ministry's program, as I said, is to do a group of studies for a number of projects so that we are able to make the private sector feel content with them.

In contrast to that, the private sector existing today is expanding and improving its present situation. The light manufacturing plants that we have spoken briefly about previously, like those for rugs, wool clothing, knitwear, handbags, belts, and suitcases, are expanding their production and operations and are undertaking development projects. In addition we are completely ready and prepared to do a study and we give any proposal, presented to us by the private sector for building a new concern, care and complete attention, in accordance with the investments act, and we give it the opportunities for sufficient study of the alternatives which the law offers. Some expatriates apply on their own, on the strength of a certain expertise which they acquired through their work in a certain field abroad, or some who have sons who have expertise in this or that aspect apply for a limited liability manufacturing firm, and they say, "I want this manufacturing firm because my experience in it is such and such." On our part we look into the case of this firm, does it exist in the country or not? What would the revenues be that it would earn? What would be the hard currency that it would garner in the event it began exporting? What would be the hard currency that it would save if we were importing its product? In other words, a complete study of the indicators it must have to achieve its goal. The most important thing that we concentrate on is that there is added value in the National Product with not less than 30 percent locally contributed; that is, we do not advise setting up a manufacturing firm where all its raw materials come from abroad and do not utilize local production.

[Question] Are there any requests coming from foreign capital sources to set up manufacturing projects or to participate in them as a result of the investments act making that easier?

[Answer] Nothing but ideas proposed by some foreign companies, especially in the free zone; that is, there has not yet been submitted complete project for industrial production. There is only a collection of ideas proposed and studied by some companies, although there is a group of foreign companies, some of them Japanese, that have advanced some ideas about setting up projects in the free zone and some to set up projects within the Republic where a part of the production would be marketed abroad. In other words, they are now at the stage of familiarizing themselves with the institutions, the commercial laws, and means of operations in the country, for example the taxes or customs duties. In a general way this process of making contacts and familiarization is a kind of confidence and self-assuredness with the stability of circumstances in PDRY and that there are institutions here that respect their commitments and transactions with others just as others respect their commitments and agreements.

[Question] What do you have to say about the propaganda and biased statements which have spread their poisons abroad, and are counter to the movement to encourage expatriate and foreign capital from investing in the country? What is the truth about these claims and what are their aims? Do you have a call out for this capital to invest its wealth in the country to restore it to profitable use and for the country to advance and prosper?

[Answer] At the present I do not believe that there is anything to fear at all. The only fear that manifestly appears to exist is not due to the laws in force. Here there is only a fear of the projects and their characteristics because those people who advance them or who have ideas for industrial projects, most of them are merchants with stores or different commercial activities, but when it comes to operating a factory it requires knowledge and experience. In truth the experience will be provided to him who invests because we are not newcomers to the industrial sector, and we have accumulated some experience which he can profitably utilize just as we can extend to him local cadres which can assist him in laying the necessary groundwork for production or we can permit him to bring in a foreign company to do a study, as we have objections but would welcome that and we would present them with all the necessary information.

In my estimation the propaganda once used to say that countermeasures against one's capital investment would be carried out and also there was the issue of nationalization, but that was clearly taken care of by the law in a proper legal manner. In article 7 of the investments act the text says "It is not permitted to seize the capital stock of projects, or to freeze it or to require its sequestration except through legal means." In truth there is not any justification for any fear since the issuance of this law, or even previously under the old law. And while the state has permitted this sector to be included both in joint and private operations, we must be confident that the state wants to promote investment and has already studied all aspects connection to this or that project and has given a decision to this or that.

The experience has been clear that none of the existing industrial projects in the private sector has been subjected to any measures that the applicable laws have imposed, that is, its affairs have been run like the affairs of the public and joint sectors. As to whether fear has resulted from a mistaken or hostile political impression that some individual may have, well that is another matter. However, I believe that all the returned emigrants are attentive, percipient, and nationalistic enough that they can discriminate, examine, and scrutinize the likes of these propaganda claims. The Yemeni citizenry are not strangers to this country. They frequently come and go from it and witness its advances and accomplishments which are achieved every day. No citizen of this country can say that from one visit to the next visit there has not been any change at all unless that person is what you would call blind and does not see anything changing. Any citizen, if he passed a year abroad and returned to the country, would find something new on his way back to his village, or in Aden, or he would find in his region a building going up or he would find some advance, the process of development moving on a wide and rapid scale. This notion is one of the incentives for confidence. The hostile propaganda claims center on the issues which, in my opinion, are finished, nothing but a burnt page, idle talk, or a scratched record, because the people now know the issues palpably well and interact with all the institutions found in the country, safely and honorably. The state respects all its laws.

We do not issue an investments law to trap people with it. That is very strange talk, illogical. In fact our country is a member of the Arab Organization for Investment surety and of the Arab Investments Office which guarantees Arab and foreign investments, and this is with the aim to instill confidence in the country. To reconfirm that, recently a group of documents were received that were specially concerned with investigating aspects of investment in PDRY and they made a comparison between our investments law and those same laws in other countries. These documents revealed that the investments act of PDRY contains a wide-ranging vision and remarkable foresight, and that it is precise in all its articles, paragraphs, and points. We consider this testimony to be sufficient to those others that the regime in PDRY knows what it wants and knows how to conduct the developmental process without difficulties or doubts. In my estimation the most important thing is the investor himself, that he have high nationalist sentiment, the boldness to be enterprising with industrialization, and the expertise acquired during his experiences. As for reservations and fear, in my opinion, they do not influence the investor on the national capital level on work in industry. Otherwise, the individual can have a shop or anything else. For in industrial investment or any investment there must be some risk-taking and adventuresomeness. The state itself is taking a risk while it is sharing in this risky venture by entering into joint projects with the joint sector.

There is risk in commerce and their risks are greater than any other field. But we inform our brother investors that commerce, while it was appropriate to you, may not be appropriate for your sons because there is nothing certain in it. Business affairs are conducted in the market according to the law of the sea. The big fish eats the small fish. That's well known. But industry

is something assured. That is, you are founding something that can earn an income for your sons, and after them there is something there, with tools and equipment, providing full protection. Meaning that our industry does not operate in a free market where anyone can come and contend with you in production or prices. For example, when a sponge factory is set up, I will lock the door to further sponge imports, and when cigarette manufacture begins I will lock the door to cigarette imports, and so on with all other products.

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CSO: 4404/412

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

HADRAMAWT ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY ANNOUNCES NEW PROJECTS

Aden 14 UKTUBAR AL-USBU'I in Arabic 6 May 83 p 2

[Text] In the first quarter of the production competitions plan for 1983 the General Electric Power Authority for Hadramawt Province has implement 95 percent of the work on the Jawl-Masahah-Fuwwah line project and 80 percent of the project to improve the line of the al-Mukalla network.

These two projects are considered to be among the projects of the third year of the second overall five-year plan. The amount spent on the Jawl-Masahah-Fuwwah project has come to 71 dinars [sic] while the project to improve the al-Mukalla network has cost 80,000 dinars.

The comrade engineer of transmission and distribution for the branch office of the General Electric Power Authority in a statement to the Aden News Agency given yesterday morning said that the Jawl-Masahah-Fuwwah line project which will come to some 20 kilometers in length had already begun its work last year and would bring high-tension electric current to the region with 30,000 volts and 3 megawatts of power.

He explained that work on the project to upgrade the al-Mukalla area network had started its preliminary arrangements by the establishment of two new power stations, the laying of 1,500 meters of cable in the al-'Umal District, putting up a large portion of the overhead lines from the chief power station, erecting two transformers, and laying 7,500 meters of cable in October District.

He added that there is a ground network project in Khalaf region. Its expenditure amounts to 26,000 dinars. It had been slated for work to begin on it during the third and fourth quarters of this year. This project will bring electricity to the cannery factory and refrigeration plant in al-Mukalla and the fish-meal factory in Khalaf region.

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CSO: 4404/412

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

YEMEN MARITIME FIRM TO ADD ANOTHER SHIP

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 15 May 83 p 2

[Text] The Yemeni Maritime Lines Company is currently studying a special project to purchase a modern, multi-purpose freighter with a freight capacity of 500 tons with the aim of developing the present maritime fleet.

Aden News Agency has learned that the total receipts of the company for the first quarter of the current year amount to 91,955 dinars. Also the total amount of goods transported was 9,661 freight tons. The number of trips made between the ports of the Republic and the Red Sea and East Africa was 16.

It must be pointed out that the company's receipts during 1982 amounted to 665,186 dinars and the total of transported goods was 34,329 freight tons. The number of voyages between the ports of the Republic and the Red Sea and East Africa was 53.

It is well-known that the company was established through ministerial council decision number eight of 1980 [sic] and it began operating a commercial maritime fleet in 1974 by the purchase of two modern freighters, the Barim and al-Mukalla. The company also obtained another freighter, the "'Adan," when it began operations between ports located on the Red Sea and in East Africa, transporting exports of salt and transit goods.

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CSO: 4404/412

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

DELEGATION RETURNS FROM BULGARIA--The party and government delegation which is headed by Brother Mahmud an-Najashi, Central Committee member and deputy secretary of the Central Committee, returned to Aden from Sofia today following a visit to the GDR and Bulgaria, during which talks between officials in both countries were held with the aim of developing and bolstering bilateral relations. [GF061830 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 6 Jul 83 GF]

MINISTER RETURNS FROM USSR--'Abd al-Qadir Ba-Jammal, candidate member of the YSP Central Committee and minister of industry, returned to Aden from the Soviet Union this morning after a working visit that lasted for several days, during which he held talks with a number of Soviet officials on a number of economic issues, particularly the projects that are being implemented in cooperation with the Soviet Union. [Excerpt] [GF051412 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 5 Jul 83 GF]

CSO: 4400/413

SWEDISH-SUPPORTED CLINIC IN NURAN AREA AIDS WAR VICTIMS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Jun 83 p 13

[Article by Katarina Engberg: "Report from Wartime Afghanistan; 'Swedish Clinic' Guarded Around the Clock']

[Text] "Hurry up! What are you waiting for? That the Russians will start bombing?" Tribal chief Abdella Khan walks restlessly back and forth. He wants us quickly to end our visit to the "Swedish" clinic here in the Nuran valley.

Yesterday Russian fighter aircraft bombed the Fahrid valley nearby. Perhaps today it is the turn of the Nuran valley?

We got up with the second prayer of the Muslim ritual, that is to say at dawn.

As early as 0600 hours a few villagers squatted under a mulberry tree waiting for Hakkim, the medical assistant, to open the clinic. Hakkim fetches a few cases of medicine and carries them up to the roof terrace of the simple stone house in which the clinic is housed.

A farmer in the village has lent the building and is now standing guard outside together with two young men with Kalashnikovs on their shoulders.

They are all mujaheddin, resistance men, and are to see to it that nothing bad will happen to the clinic.

More Clinics

For the first time since the war began in 1978 the tens of thousands of people in the valleys around here have access to simple medical care. SIDA's [Swedish International Development Aid] more than 1-million Kronor disaster aid has made it possible to establish this clinic in the Kunar province of northeastern Afghanistan. Seven such clinics are scattered over other parts of the country.

When the caravan of mules, loaded with medicines, a few months ago crossed over the mountain ridge and entered the valley, the tribal chiefs sent a group of

men as an escort to see to it that the medicines were put in place in the house selected for the clinic.

"All the tribes and parties in the valley welcome the clinic and promise to guarantee its safety," Abdella Khan promises.

That is an important guarantee. If any group in the valley were to feel unfairly treated by the personnel at the clinic, the activity there could have a divisive effect on the population instead of a unifying one. Medicines and healing power carry authority in wartime Afghanistan.

To Pakistan

From the Kunar provinces a sick person can be carried to Pakistan in a few days to seek medical care in the refugee camps. But the population in the interior of the country lack this opportunity.

In one hour Hakkim has had time to see 10 patients. He takes their blood pressure, asks about the complaints and searches in his medicine boxes. Antibiotics are prescribed for a child with a throat infection. A mother with a screaming child on her arm is given medicine for the child's intestinal worms. But Hakkim cannot do anything for the woman with tuberculosis. She should try to get down to Peshawar in Pakistan to have the tumor on the underside of her throat examined, he suggests.

The medicines begin to run out after 3 months of activity, and Doctor Rahman, who heads the activity at the clinic, is in Peshawar, Pakistan, in order to prepare for a new shipment of medicines across the mountains.

Hakkim changes the bandage on a boy's head. His mother thinks that I am a physician and pulls me into a remote corner where she shows me her severely varicose veins.

The clinic lacks female medical personnel, a shortage which is often pointed out by the population. In Afghanistan it is unthinkable for a male physician to examine an unknown woman.

Major Event

The patient file shows that the clinic has treated 4,000 patients in 3 months. About 40 of them were wounded mujaheddin, who had simple wounds and gunshot injuries treated.

It is simple medical care that is given by Hakkim and Doctor Rahman at the "Swedish" clinic. But to the population in the Nuran valley the establishment of the clinic is a major event. It relieves the suffering among the population. And, says Abdella Khan, it shows that the world has not forgotten the Afghan people and its struggle. He adds, in the typical, proud Afghan manner: "We will continue fighting against the Russian occupation even if we do not get any support from outside. But you should support us. With our

bodies we are stopping an enemy who threatens democracy and independence all over the world."

More Ideas

A large part of the population of the Nuran valley has already visited the clinic. A minority because they were sick, most of them purely out of curiosity and to "be examined by the doctor."

In every village we visit the villagers have opinions about the clinic: Could it not be moved to a bigger house, so that patients could spend a night? The way it is now the sick people have to be placed in the village mosque.

There are suggestions for several suitable buildings which the villagers are prepared to let for free. And a few rope beds could be scrounged up. One room in the clinic ought to be set aside for the jirghan, the council of tribal chiefs, when they meet. And should it not be possible to open a school, too? The children have been without school since 1978. All that is needed is writing materials. Some young men with high school education in the valley could serve as teachers. Yes, and then a tent is needed, which could be raised on the slope of the mountain and be used as a school building. That way the risks connected with the repeated bombings could be minimized.

The war and the military aspects can never be forgotten. Bombed-out houses are gaping in the villages. Behind the "Swedish" clinic lie the torn-up remains of a bomb.

Flew by

The snow-covered mountain ranges are beginning to be lit by the rising sun as Hakkim takes a pause to talk about how he came to be a medical assistant at the clinic:

"I fled to Pakistan, in connection with the Russian invasion in 1979. Last year the Society of Afghan Doctors asked the tribal leaders here in the valley to pick a high school-educated young man from the area to take a course in medical care in Deshavar. They picked me."

"I come from this valley, here I can serve the population. This is my way of participating in Jihad, the holy war."

A foreign, mechanical, sound interrupts Hakkim.

"The Migs are coming!"

Two Russian fighters are howling in over the valley, and we have to run to take cover under a few big rocks. In three waves the fighters pass over us and continue into the Ganzara valley, a side valley to the Nuran valley. The bomb explosions can be heard clearly and dryly on the other side of the mountain pass.

The villages in the Nuran valley were not the bombing target. But in the Ganzara valley the bombings on this day claimed 10 deaths among the population.

SIDA Pays for the Care

At the end of last year SIDA allocated over a million kronor for medical care to the population inside Afghanistan. The money has been administered by the Swedish Afghan Committee, which used it to establish eight clinics in the country.

Abroad the method is called "the Swedish model."

The UN and a number of humanitarian relief organizations are assisting refugee Afghans but do not reach the more than 10 million peoples remaining in Afghanistan. This is because the UN recognizes the central government in Kabul and thus does not consider itself able to help the great majority of the population which lives outside the control of the government and the Soviet troops.

The personnel at the "Swedish" clinics is Afghan. Their salaries are paid with Swedish funds.

The "Swedish model" for relief to Afghanistan has attracted international attention. Many countries and organizations are studying the possibility of following the Swedish example.

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CSO: 3650/223

COMMENTARY EXAMINES SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ' VISIT

GF101350 Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jul 83 p 7

[Editorial: "Mr Shultz in Islamabad"]

[Text] The American secretary of state's visit to Pakistan has confirmed the new political and security equation Islamabad has forged with Washington in the last one year or so. Mr George Shultz described the prospects of a long-term relationship between the two countries as "excellent" and based on "solid foundations of common interest". From the public statements made by Mr Shultz in Islamabad, it appears that the four "vulnerabilities" in Pakistan-U.S. relations which Ambassador Spiers had spoken about last year have for the time being almost ceased to be worrisome. These were specified as Pakistan's nuclear programme, narcotics, India and the absence of democratic institutions in Pakistan. Mr Shultz expressed support for Pakistan's nuclear programme and accepted the assurances given by President Zia in respect of its non-military nature. The American secretary of state also said that he was "heartened" by the reports he had received about Pakistan's efforts to check the narcotic trade. His opinions on Indo-Pakistan ties and the political structure in Pakistan made it clear that these issues no longer impinge on the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations. This will obviously be viewed with considerable satisfaction in official circles in Islamabad. Equally significant is the support the U.S. Government has expressed for Pakistan in its striving for the preservation of its sovereignty, freedom and dignity. In this context, the shared concern of the two governments over developments in Afghanistan and for the security of the region is quite significant. Pakistan's position on Afghanistan will be reinforced by Mr Shultz's reiteration of his government's stand on the four principles laid down by the UN Assembly and the OIC, namely, withdrawal of Soviet forces, return of the refugees to their homes, under conditions of safety and honour, the right of the Afghans to choose their own form of government and the restoration of Afghanistan's status as an independent and non-aligned entity.

The U.S. Pakistan joint commission set up during President Zia's visit to Washington last December held its first meeting during Mr Shultz's visit. The proceedings of the commission confirmed the deep interest of the two sides in institutionalising bilateral cooperation. The establishment of the three

subcommissions on trade, education and culture, and science and technology should help promote greater contacts and closer ties between the U.S. and Pakistan. Not that the two countries have been lagging behind in these areas. The U.S. has been one of Pakistan's largest trading partners. A number of Pakistanis are studying or being trained in the United States, cultural contacts are frequent and, of late, an intensive effort is being made to increase American investments in Pakistan. The subcommissions which are expected to begin functioning before the end of the year would help to identify new areas of cooperation and to introduce greater reciprocity and balance in economic relations. Mr Shultz has also assured Islamabad that the Reagan administration has taken a number of steps to ensure a continued flow of aid to Pakistan, which has on occasions been slowed down on account of the U.S. budgetary and congressional processes.

What should, however, be most gratifying for Pakistan is the support Mr Shultz has expressed for Islamabad's efforts to seek a peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue. It is significant that the American secretary of state expressed himself in a positive vein on the Geneva conference and denied the Soviet charges that the U.S. was opposed to a peaceful solution of the Afghanistan issue. It was, however disappointing that Mr Shultz did not say anything to clear up the prevailing misgivings on the question of American "guarantees" on Afghanistan, which could in the final analysis prove to be central to the peace package being negotiated at Geneva. Before Mr Shultz' departure from Washington, a spokesman of the U.S. Administration had made it clear that the U.S., while it was willing to look at any thing, "will not guarantee anything it knows nothing about". It has been hoped that after two rounds of talks with the Pakistan foreign minister, one in Washington last month and the other in Islamabad earlier this week, the American secretary of state would be better informed about the nature of guarantees, which some of the other interested governments were prepared to extend. In any case, it is to be hoped that the Pakistan Government will press on with its quest for a political solution of the crisis in Southwest Asia. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized for the longer the crisis is allowed to drag on, the greater will be the likelihood of its acquiring the dimensions of an East-West issue. This would obviously limit Pakistan's freedom of action in the matter. Moreover, any intensification of the crisis would have serious implications for Pakistan's security. Although the U.S. has expressed itself strongly in support of Pakistan's security concerns--and the military assistance it is extending to Islamabad is proof of its genuine concern for Pakistan's defence needs--it is important that the two countries try to conduct their relations within the framework of non-alignment. This they have so far succeeded in doing. Washington has hitherto shown a healthy appreciation of Pakistan's position as a member of the non-aligned movement. It should be our constant concern that this stays unchanged and that the quality of our nonalignment remains undiminished. The non-bloc character of the movement as well as the unalterable geopolitical location of Pakistan in relation to the USSR rules out any idea of this country developing a permanent adversary relationship with the USSR. This, of course, assumes that the USSR, for its part, has no fundamental interest in adopting a hostile attitude towards this country.

CSO: 4600/745

PRO, ANTI REGIME ACTIVITIES ON 5 JULY REPORTED

GF101342 Karachi DAWN in English 6 Jul 83 p 12

[Excerpts] July 5, the date on which President Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq assumed power during a period of national crisis six years ago, was observed on Tuesday at "Youm-i-Tashakkur" (Day of Thanksgiving) and "Youm-i-Nijat" (Day of Deliverance) by a recently set-up body, "Zia Himayat Tehrik" ["Support Zia Movement"] and as a "Black Day" (Youm-i-Siah) by the MRD.

While wall-posters displaying President Ziaul Haq in Sherwani and Shalwar [national dress for Pakistani males] appeared in Karachi's localities with a text lauding the government's Islamisation process, "black flags" fluttered on house-tops of the MRD leaders and workers.

Volunteers of the "Support Zia Movement," were seen distributing green arm-bands among people. They also attempted to hold corner meetings, but soon dispersed after reaching people with a pro-Zia theme.

Overall, the situation in Karachi remained calm, civic life was undisturbed, and law-enforcing agencies exercised due vigilance.

At the two focal points, namely the Defence Society residence of the externed MRD convener and president of the defunct NDP [National Democratic Party], Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, from where the protest march was to start and the Jacob Lines Mosque where it was to terminate and turn into an Iftar [breaking of daily fast during Ramadan] party meeting, the attempt by the MRD leaders to carry on the programme was foiled.

Both the places were cordoned off, while on other vantage points strong posse of police was posted to ward off any untoward happening.

At Mr Mazari's resident the MRD workers converged in small groups in the nearby streets and bylanes well ahead of schedule and when the MDR leaders-- Khwaja Khairuddin, Mr Mairaj Mohammad Khan and Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi-- reached the scene, they came out on the main boulevard chanting slogans and waiving black flags.

However, they were soon dispersed with baton charge. In the melee, Mr Mairaj sustained head injuries and was forcibly taken to the police van.

As many as 13 persons, including the several MRD leaders were rounded up and placed in detention at the Defense Society police post.

Later, five leaders of the MRD; Khwaja Khairuddin, Mr Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Maulana Ehteramul Haq Thanvi, Mr Hassan Feroz and Maulana Mohammad Qasim Khosa, were bailed out by the SDM [Subdivisional Magistrate] civil lines, Mr Gul Mohammad Umerani.

They were released on bail of Rs 5,000 each and on personal bonds of the same amount.

At the Jacob Lines Mosque a similar attempt to hold the protest demonstration was thwarted, and about a dozen arrests were made.

A hide-and-seek game followed till last evening when groups of the MRD workers were moving around in the city wearing black armbands and making good their escape as soon as the police arrived on the scene.

CSO: 4600/745

PPP LEADER CALLS FOR PURGE OF FEUDAL ELEMENTS

GF081246 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Jun 83 p 8

[Text] Lahore, 29 Jun--Shaykh Mohammad Rashid, senior vice chairman defunct Pakistan People's Party, has called upon party workers to fully devote themselves to the cause of establishment of "Awami Raj". He urged upon the party workers to work in total collaboration with the MRD for restoration of democracy and also fight within the party against feudals and capitalists with an objective to change the character of the party into a revolutionary one.

Shaykh Mohammad Rashid was speaking at an Iftar party last evening arranged by the workers of all the five city zones as a token for love and respect for the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leader on the eve of his departure to Bulgaria for treatment. Hundreds of the workers turned up to bid farewell to Shaykh Rashid, who, despite the attack of asthma, spoke for about 45 minutes during which he touched upon a number of issues. He said he would not stay abroad even one second longer after his recovery and would rush to Pakistan to play his role in the struggle for the uplift of down trodden classes.

Shaykh Rashid also made it clear that the "steering committee" of the party has not yet decided for taking part in local bodies election as the consensus of the meeting was that the decision should be taken in view of the wishes of workers. At this stage workers raised slogans for boycotting coming local bodies elections.

The PPP leader expressed his concern over incarcerations of innumerable political workers and leaders and said, many of them were behind the bars for about three years, and many of them without any trial. He also felt concern over "torturing" many political workers for their alleged connection with the "so-called" Al-Zulfikar and demanded immediate release of all of them. He also called for the release of Miss Benazir Bhutto, Air Marshal (rtd) Asghar Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Irshad Rao.

Sh Rashid said it was heartening that defunct JUP [Jamiat ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan] and PNP [Pakistan National Party] were also supporting the cause of democracy. He criticised the defunct Jamaat Islami for playing the role of "B" team of martial law." Shaykh Mohammad Rashid later flew to Bulgaria via Islamabad along with his wife. He was seen off at the Lahore airport by a large number of party workers.

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PROBLEMS OF STEEL MILL REVIEWED

GF081232 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Jun 83 p 4

[Text] The success story of the Pakistan Steel Mills and the steady progress of work on that gargantuan project as related to journalists the other day by the chairman of the PASMIC [Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation], Mr H. N. Akhtar, makes gratifying reading. The Soviet Union without whose assistance this undertaking of vital importance could not have been taken in hand is now reported to have assured Mr Akhtar during his recent visit to Moscow that the Soviet Union would extend full support and help in setting up down-stream industrial units and unstinted cooperation to the private sector eager to take a hand in this venture.

That the issue of further supplies of equipment and machinery was also satisfactorily resolved during the chairman's negotiations in Moscow is equally heartening. The machinery and material now required to start work on the hot strip and cold rolling mill is expected to be received with in the next three to four months and these would be ready to go into trial production early next year.

It is unfortunate that work on the mill, originally estimated to cost Rs 19 billion, should have been delayed resulting in an increase in its cost by another 6 billion rupees. Any further delay it is said, will lead to a progress escalation in cost at the rate of Rs 185 crore every year. The need, therefore, to avoid any waste of time does not need to be underscored. It should be realised that if Pakistan has lagged behind in its industrial progress, it has largely been due to our inability to make up our mind soon enough and go ahead with the commencement of work on this project of paramount importance.

From the day this country came into being vested interests who had a hand in policymaking did not want the enterprise to be undertaken as a state venture. Their manipulations made successive governments stall the issue allowing the final cost to multiply to its present level. It was manifestly unpatriotic of the capitalist-politicians holding ministerial offices to have done such outrageous disservice to their homeland, and contemporary bureaucrats chary of asserting themselves.

It may be recalled that very early in the life of Pakistan when it was still an incipient state, those who held the reins of its administration gave cause for grave annoyance to the Soviet Union and opted to place all their eggs in one basket--that of the United States. The dubious friendship of Washington, which has since then betrayed this country on more occasions than one, and the diplomatic myopia demonstrated in 1949 had done grievous damage before we could mend our fences somewhat with Moscow. However, there is no point in lamenting past follies howsoever egregious. It is for us to make amends now, though belatedly, and keep our options open.

Had it not been for Moscow's assistance the steel mills at Pipri in Karachi might still have been a distant dream. Neighbouring India which has from the beginning been following a pragmatic policy, is today having the best of both the worlds, and it is time we gave a new orientation to our foreign relations and liberated our country from the grooves in which it has rested and remained almost static all along. National interests are supreme and these should not be made subservient to the predilections of ideologues if a reorientation of our policies does not pose a threat to the ideology of Islam and of Pakistan.

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PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

CABINET GETS ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS--The country's exports during the next financial year are expected to grow in dollar terms by 11 percent, including a 6 percent growth in volume. This information was given to the federal cabinet meeting in Rawalpindi on 29 June when it discussed next year's foreign exchange budget. The meeting was told that export earnings during the current financial year will be slightly above the target of \$2.60 billion. While presenting the assessment of the remittances by overseas Pakistanis, the cabinet was told that these remittances are likely to increase by 28 percent. It is expected that this year's earnings in this sector will be \$2.85 billion as compared to the \$2.24 billion last year. It is expected that the foreign exchange reserves by the end of next financial year will be about \$2 billion. [Excerpts] [BK021615 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 30 Jun 83 BK]

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